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When Stop and Frisk Comes 




In response to programmatic stop-and-frisk, police killings, and 
other recent controversies in American policing, many have called for 
“smart policing”—the evidence-based deployment of police resources. 
An often-heralded example of smart policing is hot spots policing, which 
involves directing police attention to locations where crime and disorder 
fester. It is difficult to argue with the logic of hot spots policing, and 
this Article does not do so. Instead, it critically examines how the 
Fourth Amendment operates when hot spots policing and similar 
targeted strategies are used in a common setting: public housing 
developments and their private counterparts.  
Largely because of mass criminalization, Fourth Amendment law 
allows police to lay siege to public housing and the people who live in 
it. Public housing developments and their private counterparts have 
historical reputations as problem places, and law enforcement has 
subjected these locations to specialized policing programs for decades. 
Given the low Fourth Amendment standards for stops, arrests, and 
searches in connection with minor misconduct, that outsized attention 
combines with the astounding array of conduct regulated in public and 
patrolled housing to permit police nearly unfettered authority. Fourth 
Amendment protections usually associated with the home are virtually 
unrecognizable in these places. Instead, the Fourth Amendment fuels 
the use of law enforcement as a tool of social control in public and 
patrolled housing. As such, the harms of programmatic stop-and-frisk 
are not remedied, but simply concentrated and localized. Policing in 
public and patrolled housing thus offers a cautionary tale of the limits 
of “smart policing” as an answer to abusive police practices. 
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It is axiomatic that the home enjoys the greatest Fourth 
Amendment protection. Indeed, the “cult of the home” has led to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that protects the home more than 
virtually any other location.1 Although this concept has long been 
acknowledged to have greater resonance for those with more space 
rather than less, the notion that “the home is the castle” is widely 
accepted.2 But closer examination reveals that this acceptance does not 
bear the weight of scrutiny. Fourth Amendment protection of the home 
 
1. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the 
Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 905, 912–16 (2010) (describing 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provides extraordinary protection 
for the home). 
2. See generally 1 Wayne LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on 
the Fourth Amendment § 2.3 (5th ed. 2012) (“[O]ne’s dwelling has 
generally been viewed as the area most resolutely protected by Fourth 
Amendment.”). This maxim apparently pre-dates even English common 
law. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 197 n.3 (1993). 
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is particularly circumscribed for some: residents of public housing and 
private housing developments subject to routine police patrol.3 
Residents of such developments and their visitors are subject to regular 
and intrusive police encounters—ranging from “voluntary” ones to 
stops, arrests, and searches—in and around their buildings based on 
little to no suspicion of criminal activity. These places, and the people 
who live in them, are subject to extensive scrutiny by law enforcement 
in the hallways, stairwells, courtyards, and other common spaces of 
their homes—encounters that are simply unimaginable in residences of 
the well-heeled and wealthy. 
This Article examines the intersection of the policing strategies 
frequently used in such locations and Fourth Amendment doctrine to 
argue that Fourth Amendment law plays a critical role in fueling such 
intense police oversight and surveillance of public and patrolled housing 
that they are sometimes effectively rendered occupied territories. Police 
often label public and patrolled housing developments problem places 
and accordingly develop programs aimed squarely at them. In addition, 
they adopt “hot spots” strategies4 and focus their use on public and 
patrolled housing. The primary way Fourth Amendment law 
encourages these practices is its permissiveness of seizures and searches 
in response to even the most minor misbehavior. The excessive 
regulation of conduct in and around such housing developments—
achieved by statutes and ordinances that specifically govern conduct in 
those locations as well as “house rules” and similar restrictions enforced 
by police—combined with the freedom accorded police when they 
operate in these locales effectively provides police carte blanche to stop, 
arrest, and search everyone they encounter. 
While hot spots policing strategies like those used in public and 
patrolled housing has become wildly popular among American police 
departments, legal scholarship examining the implications of their use 
has not kept pace. Legal scholars have long lamented the limited 
protection the Fourth Amendment offers to the urban poor5 and racial 
 
3. The term “public and patrolled housing” will be used throughout this 
Article to refer to these developments. As used here, “patrolled housing” 
refers to multi-unit dwellings subject to regular patrol by police or other 
law enforcement officers, typically as a result of agreement between the 
landlord and a local law enforcement agency. Some of these private 
developments receive government funding, but many are purely private. 
See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra Part I(B) for discussion of hot spots strategies. 
5. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 391, 401, 405 (2003) (observing that 
“Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on the extent to which 
one can afford accoutrements of wealth such as a freestanding home, 
fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and vision- and sound-proof doors and 
walls,” and noting that people who live in “tenements or other crowded 
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minorities more generally.6 In the realm of police programs, they have 
also examined and criticized “programmatic stop and frisk,” through 
which police departments instruct their officers to aggressively stop and 
frisk civilians.7 And, although there is extensive criminology literature 
about hot spots policing, which primarily addresses the impact of hot 
spots strategies on crime,8 there is a lack of legal scholarship that offers 
 
areas” are “much more likely to experience unregulated government 
intrusions”); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1265, 1270–73 (1999) (arguing that 
“[p]rivacy follows space, and people with money have more space than 
people without,” leaving the urban poor, particularly African Americans, 
more subject to police scrutiny because “[p]rivacy, as Fourth Amendment 
law defines it, is something people tend to have a lot of only when they 
also have a lot of other things”). 
6. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, 
Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 
(2011); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 946 (2002) [hereinafter Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth 
Amendment]; Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented 
Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543 (2011); David A. Harris, 
Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Factors for 
Reasonable Suspicion]; Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—
Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should 
Race Matter?, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243 (1991); Anthony C. Thompson, 
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 956 (1999); see also Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1272–73 (“Poverty 
among certain population groups in certain parts of the country is almost 
exclusively an urban phenomenon . . . . Poor blacks are more likely to live 
in cities, surrounded by other poor blacks. If the law is tilted against the 
urban poor, it is bound have a racial tilt as well.”) (footnotes omitted). 
7. See Frank Rudy Cooper, A Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk: 
The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit, 73 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 14–21 (2018) 
(describing programmatic stop and frisk and distilling scholarly treatment 
of the subject); see also Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: 
Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not 
an Incident, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 159, 159 (2016) (describing programmatic 
stop and frisk as “a deliberate program of stopping and frisking individuals 
throughout [New York City], concentrated in certain areas, for the stated 
purpose of suppressing crime”). 
8. See Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Constructing Hot Spots Policing: 
Unexamined Consequences for Disadvantaged Populations and for Police 
Legitimacy, 22 Crim. J. Pol’y Rev. 350, 358 (2011) (noting that “few 
evaluation studies measure outcomes beyond crime rates” and that the 
usual definition of “hot spots” makes “[p]eople in hot spots . . . ancillary 
to the characteristics of the place itself”). As Tracey Meares has pointed 
out, criminologists seem to assume—erroneously—that police always act 
lawfully. Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference 
Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It 
Matters, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1865, 1874 (2013). 
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a critical analysis of how hot spots policing and similar place-based 
policing strategies interplay with the Fourth Amendment.9 This Article 
fills the gap and explores the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when 
police implement programs in public housing and private patrolled 
housing developments. It concludes that residents and visitors of such 
developments are uniquely vulnerable to police surveillance and control. 
Moreover, it reveals that the long-acknowledged anemic Fourth 
Amendment protections for the urban poor are especially weak in hot 
spots; in the context of public and patrolled housing, that weakness 
profoundly affects the everyday interactions between residents and the 
police. Actions deemed lawful under the Fourth Amendment can leave 
public and patrolled housing residents particularly vulnerable to 
surveillance, police encounters and stops, as well as searches and 
arrests. 
By permitting such extensive dominion over the residents and 
visitors of public and patrolled housing, the Fourth Amendment 
facilitates social control of the largely impoverished residents of public 
and patrolled housing, who are, at least in public housing, largely black 
and brown.10 Similar to the criminalization of welfare recipients, who 
 
9. Rachel Harmon and Aziz Huq have touched upon hot spots policing in 
their analyses, respectively, of arrest and stop-and-frisk practices. See 
Rachel Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307 (2016) [hereinafter 
Harmon, Why Arrest?]; Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 
Mich. L. Rev. 761, 794 & n.130 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, The Problem 
of Policing]; Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: 
Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 Minn. L. 
Rev. 2397, 2422–25 (2017). In addition, it is worth noting that Jeffrey 
Fagan has published two extensive empirical analyses of the New York 
City Police Department’s enforcement practices in public housing. See 
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 
9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 697 (2012) [hereinafter Fagan et al., Race 
and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing] (evaluating the role of race 
in determining level of trespass enforcement in public housing); Jeffrey 
Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York 
City, 13 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 415 (2006) [hereinafter Fagan 
et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program] (analyzing the 
impact of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
Drug Elimination Program on crime in New York City public housing). 
10. Over two million people reside in public housing, of whom approximately 
67 percent were minorities in 2017. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Dev., 
Assisted Housing: National and Local Datasets, https://www.huduser.gov/ 
portal/datasets/assthsg.html [https://perma.cc/3E7U-WJ8Y] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2019) (follow “Data”; then follow “2017—Based on Census 2010 
geographies” and select “U.S. Total”). Because policing programs in 
patrolled housing (as defined in this Article) are not regulated or subject 
to routine data collection, it would be impossible to determine the racial 
makeup of patrolled housing. That said, there is reason to believe its 
residents are also largely black and brown. 
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are subject to substantial regulation of their conduct,11 the residents 
and visitors of public and patrolled housing do not enjoy the same 
freedom to move about their daily lives that most Americans expect. 
Instead, they may find that even the most mundane rule violations 
subject them to police encounters, which sometimes end with 
detentions, jail time, and criminal prosecutions. The treatment of these 
problem places in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is yet another 
mechanism by which the Fourth Amendment permits profiling, with 
place effectively allowed to become a proxy for race and class. This 
dynamic undermines core Fourth Amendment interests and values, 
including autonomy, the right to locomotion, and dignity interests. It 
also demonstrates the limits of “smart policing,” which reformers 
frequently call for in response to abuses like programmatic stop-and-
frisk, and is supposed to use evidence to direct police resources where 
they are needed most. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the rise of two 
categories of policing programs that have been used to target public 
and patrolled housing: those that are focused on housing developments, 
sometimes funded by the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban 
Development, and hot spots policing more generally. Resting largely on 
criminology scholarship, this examination is useful because it 
demonstrates that the police focus on public and patrolled housing has 
not occurred randomly or by happenstance; instead, it is the result of 
a conscious effort to exploit the uniquely expansive authority police 
have in public and patrolled housing. 
Part II addresses the Fourth Amendment doctrines that work 
together to limit protection against searches and seizures in and around 
public and patrolled housing. Fourth Amendment law permits police to 
subject residents and others who frequent public and patrolled housing 
to routine and virtually suspicionless stops, arrests, and searches largely 
because of “mass criminalization”12 in public and patrolled housing, i.e., 
the hyper regulation of behavior through the use of house rules and 
similar standards. First, the standards for stops and high-crime area 
doctrine function together to permit stops for virtually any infraction. 
Courts have utterly failed to attach any meaning to the term high- 
11. See Kaaryn Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: Public Assistance 
and the Criminalization of Welfare 60–70 (2012) (describing 
administrative rules and punishments utilized in welfare system); Priscilla 
A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the 
Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1540 
(2012) (exploring racially exclusionary practices that effectively restrict 
access of poor black women to publicly subsidized housing in white 
communities). 
12. As described more fully in Part II, Devon Carbado coined this term. See 
Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of 
Some of the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2016). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
When Stop and Frisk Comes Home 
675 
crime area, giving police officers extraordinary latitude to conduct stops 
in any locations they define as such. This broad authority operates with 
mass criminalization to provide police with especially expansive power 
to conduct stops of people in and around public and patrolled housing. 
Second, there is the Atwater rule, which permits arrest for “very minor 
crimes,” i.e., effectively anything—including behavior regulated by 
housing rules rather than criminal law.13 This rule grants police 
expansive power to arrest, no matter how trivial the charge. Third, the 
search incident to arrest doctrine leads to exploratory searches in public 
and patrolled housing. The permission provided in Atwater to arrest for 
virtually any offense can be exploited to facilitate widespread searches, 
and some police departments invoke the exception to justify searches 
of people in and around public and patrolled housing without even 
making arrests. Several appellate courts have refused to suppress 
evidence in this context, thus implicitly encouraging its use. Together, 
these three doctrines legalize routine stops, arrests, and searches in 
public and patrolled housing. They reveal that when police label places 
as problems, police can exercise virtually limitless authority to seize and 
search the people within them. Part II ends with a case study of New 
York City Police Department programs that involve frequent patrols—
both inside and out—of public housing and private apartment 
complexes. It illustrates how targeted policing programs operate with 
the Fourth Amendment powers described in Part II to leave residents 
defenseless against police surveillance and intrusions anywhere but in 
the inner sanctums of their apartments. 
Part III describes the costs associated with the aggressive stop, 
arrest, and search practices frequently used in public and patrolled 
housing, including the substantial disconnect between the traditional 
articulation of Fourth Amendment values and the lived experiences of 
people in public and patrolled housing. In addition, it details the unique 
harms that flow from the use of such order maintenance tactics in 
homes. 
Part IV describes remedies for the severe limits on Fourth 
Amendment protection for people who inhabit or frequent public and 
patrolled housing. Some lie in the courts, while others in political bodies 
at the state and local level. To the extent that some of the identified 
Fourth Amendment issues remain open questions, particularly those 
regarding the propriety of searches, courts should answer them in ways 
that cabin the authority of police to seize and to search. State courts 
and legislatures can also address these issues. State courts can interpret 
state laws and constitutional provisions with an eye toward the harms 
that unfold when police are given unreasonably broad authority to stop, 
arrest, and search. In particular, state courts should be attentive to 
whether their state constitutions even permit arrests for civil 
 
13. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322 (2001); infra notes 161–
172 and accompanying text. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
When Stop and Frisk Comes Home 
676 
infractions. Legislative bodies should refrain from enacting laws that 
unnecessarily criminalize conduct in public and patrolled housing and 
enact affirmative bans on stops and arrests for minor misconduct. 
Finally, local governments can both regulate police departments 
directly and decriminalize housing-related infractions. 
I. Policing Programs in Public and Patrolled 
Housing 
Residents of public and patrolled housing have been in the 
crosshairs of American police departments for over forty years. During 
a period of tremendous change in policing and coinciding with a 
newfound emphasis on place-based programs, law enforcement agencies 
have developed both programs specifically targeted at public and 
patrolled housing and hot spots strategies that have been frequently 
used in such locales.  
Over the course of the early twentieth century, policing was 
successfully transformed from a purely political and often corrupt 
exercise to a professional one that focused almost entirely on fighting 
crime.14 Police officers, who had previously been driven by parochial 
political concerns, came to be “portrayed as semi-automatic; officers 
were described as loyally following rules and as largely under 
administrative control.”15 The reform era did not, however, end all 
problems with policing. Instead, significant critiques of American 
policing practices emerged in mainstream discourse in the 1960s and 
1970s. In direct contravention to the notion of police officers as neutral, 
semi-automatic arbiters of justice, an American Bar Association study 
 
14. See Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform 53–56 
(1977) (describing the professionalization movement in policing and its 
focus on “administrative efficiency,” resulting in greater control of officers 
by police executives); Anthony A. Braga, Crime and Policing Revisited, 
New Persp. in Policing, Sept. 2015, at 3–4 (describing “pre-1930s 
‘political era’ of policing” and emergence of the professional model of 
policing); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in 
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. 
L. Rev. 551, 565–67 (1997) (describing the pre-reform era connection 
between local politics and policing and the later reforms that created 
“greater autonomy” of police); Sarah Waldeck, Cops, Community 
Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One 
Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1253, 1261 
(2000) (“Reformers severed the close ties between police and local political 
leaders, as well as between the police and neighborhoods they 
patrolled . . . . Criminal law became the primary source of police 
legitimacy, and reformers posited crime control and apprehension of 
criminals as the core police function.”). 
15. Waldeck, supra note 14, at 1261–62. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
When Stop and Frisk Comes Home 
677 
highlighted the enormous role of discretion in policing.16 Around the 
same time, longstanding complaints about police abuse by communities 
of color gained new audiences following rebellions in numerous cities.17 
In response, three major approaches have come to dominate the 
public debate about American policing since the 1970s: order 
maintenance policing, community policing, and problem-oriented 
policing.18 All three can and have been used to implement policing 
programs that target public and other patrolled housing.  
Order maintenance policing, also sometimes referred to as zero 
tolerance policing, is an heir of “Broken Windows” theory.19 According 
to Broken Windows theory, “police should address minor disorders to 
strengthen police-citizen interactions, and consequently, informal social 
control . . . . [S]igns of physical and social disorder invite criminal 
activity. Disorder indicates to law-abiding citizens that their 
neighborhoods are dangerous places, leading to their withdrawal from 
informal social control and regulation.”20 By implementing this theory 
through order maintenance policing, “police aggressively enforce laws 
against social disorder with ‘zero tolerance’ that requires arrest for any 
law infraction.”21 Accordingly, Broken Windows supporters promote 
using maximum legal authority to stop, arrest, and search people who 
live in areas with high levels of disorder.22 Of particular relevance to an 
analysis of policing programs that target particular locales, it is worth 
noting that identifying disorder may turn on the racial and class 
 
16. Id. at 1262–63 (citing American Bar Association, The Urban Police 
Function (1973)). 
17. Id. at 1262 (citing Report of the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders (1968)). 
18. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
407, 423 (2000); Livingston, supra note 14, at 562–63. 
19. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and 
Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457, 464 (2000). 
20. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, 
Broken Windows, Atlantic (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZL8A-7MG6] (“[A]t the community level, disorder and crime are usually 
inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social 
psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a 
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all of the rest of the windows 
will soon be broken.”). 
21. Fagan et al., supra note 19, at 467. 
22. See George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter? 
An Analysis of the Impact of New York City’s Police Reform 
(2001). 
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characteristics of a location’s residents.23 The Broken Windows 
approach has been subject to criticism from a variety of quarters.24 
In contrast, community policing focuses on the notion of 
partnerships between police and community. Under this theory, the 
community should play a leading role in identifying policing priorities 
and defining the problems that require police attention.25 As a National 
Institute of Justice study explained, the four principles of community 
policing are “community-based crime prevention, reorientation of 
patrol, increased police accountability, and decentralization of 
command.”26 The definition of community policing is murky and 
susceptible to wildly different, even conflicting, interpretations.27 
Accordingly, police departments may deem themselves to be practicing 
community policing even when they adopt Broken Windows practices  
23. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 
67 Soc. Psychol. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (evaluating perceptions of disorder 
and concluding that “social structure [i.e., race and class] proved a more 
powerful predictor of perceived disorder than did carefully observed 
disorder”). 
24. See, e.g., Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and 
Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s 
Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 Just. Q. 255, 273 (2010) (studying 
impact of order maintenance tactics on young men in St. Louis and 
concluding that “aggressive order maintenance manifesting in the form of 
widespread stop-and-frisks can compromise procedural justice and, 
therefore, undermine police legitimacy”); Bernard Harcourt & Jens 
Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-
City Social Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271, 277 (2006) (reviewing 
crime data in cities that utilized Broken Windows approach and finding 
that order maintenance policing cannot be deemed “the optimal use of 
scarce government resources”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the 
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the 
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York 
Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (1998); Tom R. Tyler et al., The 
Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of 
Proactive Police Contact, 12 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 602, 605 (2015) 
(using national survey data to find that aggressive order maintenance 
practices lowered police legitimacy among those who had the experience 
of “being stopped and ‘feeling like a suspect’”). 
25. Livingston, supra note 14, at 576. 
26. Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 
834, 872 n.160 (2016) (quoting William Lyons, The Politics of 
Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish 35 
(1999)). 
27. Id. at 872–73 (“[T]he theory and practices of community policing are 
muddled . . . . Often [the underlying] concepts fill in the vagaries of or 
complement one on [sic] another, but they also clash and confuse; where 
one set of practices ends and the other begins is often unclear and subject 
to debate.”); see also Livingston, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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that criminalize substantial portions of the community from which they 
are supposed to take direction.28 
Finally, problem-oriented policing embraces the notion “that the 
‘police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral 
problems that arise in the community.’”29 Specifically, it “seeks to 
identify the underlying causes of crime problems and to frame 
appropriate responses tailored to problems based on the results of 
analysis.”30 It is an approach that focuses on the underlying conditions 
in areas where disorder and crime unfold rather than the possible 
perpetrators. Along with community policing,31 reformers sometimes 
call for the use of problem-oriented policing in response to concerns 
about over-policing and criminalization.32 
The following sections summarize the historical development of the 
special attention police agencies have paid to public and patrolled 
housing and the contemporaneous rise of hot spots policing. The aim is 
to provide useful background on some of the common approaches to 
policing public and patrolled housing, so that the limits of Fourth 
Amendment protection in those locales can be more fully understood. 
 
28. See Akbar, supra note 26, at 873–75 (describing the push for community 
policing “inflected by broken windows theory” and troubling results). 
29. Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, Policing Problem 
Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention 50 (2010). 
30. Braga, supra note 14, at 12. 
31. Community policing resembles problem-oriented policing and sometimes 
incorporates problem-oriented policing processes. “The three core, and 
densely interrelated, elements of community policing are citizen 
involvement in identifying and addressing public safety concerns, the 
decentralization of decision-making down the police organizational 
hierarchy to encourage development of local responses to locally defined 
problems, and problem solving to respond to community crime and 
disorder concerns.” Id. at 11–12 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
32. See, e.g., Michael T. McPhearson, Denise Lieberman & John Chasnoff, 
New Model of Policing Needed, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/new-model-of-policing-
needed/article_83e6937b-bd23-5918-ad8a-7852f4916349.html [https:// 
perma.cc/STH6-Y2DL] (steering committee members of Don’t Shoot 
Coalition, composed of fifty St. Louis-area organizations formed after the 
killing of Michael Brown, calling for community policing and critiquing 
“[g]eographical hot-spot policing” that “disrupts whole neighborhoods”). 
But see Brendan McQuade, Against Community Policing, Jacobin (Nov. 
2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/11/obama-chicago-black-lives- 
matter-police-brutality/ [https://perma.cc/3WXV-GLZC] (arguing that 
“while . . . community policing programs purport to build stronger 
communities, they train small, self-selecting groups to amplify police 
power,” and “there is no evidence that it will bring meaningful 
accountability or otherwise curtail state violence”). 
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A. Targeting Public and Patrolled Housing 
Public housing looms large in the public imagination as a major site 
of urban disorder and criminality. Although crime problems are not, in 
fact, universal, stereotypes about the dangers of public housing are 
taken as an article of faith.33 There is reason to believe that this is true 
even among criminologists and police officials.34 Likely as a result of 
this widespread belief, police departments, and other law enforcement 
agencies have trained their attention on public housing for at least forty 
years, using a variety of approaches to address crime and disorder that 
result in substantial police surveillance and control.35 
In 1978, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) instituted federal efforts to address crime conditions in public 
housing. It provided funding to thirty-nine local public housing 
authorities with the aim of developing community-based anti-crime 
programs.36 Using what would now be described as problem-oriented  
33. Garth Davies, Crime, Neighborhood, and Public Housing 9 (2006) 
(“[W]hile there may, in fact, be some truth to the concept of ‘problem 
projects,’ it is inaccurate and unfair to paint the entire public housing 
universe with the same broad strokes.”); Fagan et al., Race and Selective 
Enforcement in Public Housing, supra note 9, at 699 (explaining that links 
between public housing and crime “are routinely revisited in the press, 
which has provided near constant reminders of the drug problems in 
public housing,” and are “reinforced by academic and media portrayals 
and lead[] to a situation where outsiders . . . perceive public housing as 
more dangerous than the facts can substantiate”); Harold R. Holzman, 
Criminological Research on Public Housing: Toward a Better 
Understanding of People, Places, and Spaces, 42 Crime & Delinq. 361, 
361 (1996) (describing public housing’s “image problem”); Langley G. 
Keyes, Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs in Subsidized 
Housing 34–35 (1992); Fritz Umbach & Alexander Gerould, Myth #3: 
Public Housing Breeds Crimes, in Public Housing Myths: 
Perception, Reality, and Social Policy 66 (Nicholas Dagen Bloom 
et al. eds., 2015) (“Portrayals of public housing complexes as ‘criminal 
paradises’ stretch back to the late 1950s, when it became obvious that 
reformers’ utopian visions of redeeming blighted urban tenements through 
modern architecture and state management had failed to deliver.”). 
34. See Davies, supra note 33, at 7; Holzman, supra note 33, at 362–63 
(describing the “information gap” in criminological research on public 
housing because of small number of studies focused on public housing). 
35. See Fagan et al., Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, supra 
note 9, at 697 (“The resulting labeling of public housing has led to a set 
of law enforcement tactics that place residents under a very close police 
gaze, justifies efforts to ‘contain’ residents within the boundaries of public 
housing sites, and legitimizes the close surveillance of visitors and 
neighbors from the surrounding communities who venture into public 
housing’s perimeter.”). 
36. Sampson O. Annan & Wesley G. Skogan, The Police Foundation, 
Drug Enforcement in Public Housing: Signs of Success in 
Denver 9 (1993); I W. Victor Rouse & Herb Rubinstein, U.S. Dep’t 
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policing strategies, the focus of these efforts was initially physical design 
and environmental issues thought to contribute to crime, such as lack 
of surveillance and lack of door and window locks.37 It did, however, 
begin a coordinated effort to increase the use of specialized police in 
public housing around the same time.38 The problem-oriented approach 
was ultimately deemed a failed effort, and attention shifted to 
enforcement-heavy approaches that were part of the larger War on 
Drugs.39 
In the 1990s, numerous local public housing authorities and cities 
began to utilize more aggressive order maintenance strategies. In 1990, 
the Police Executive Research Forum, the nation’s leading research 
institute on policing practices, published a book on policing strategies 
to address drug crimes in public housing.40 It described “occupying the 
community,” accomplished by increasing police assigned to public 
housing developments, opening “mini-police stations within the 
complexes,” and “beefing up enforcement efforts,” as a common 
approach.41 “Round-em up” tactics focused on public nuisances, and 
undercover buy-and-bust operations also became popular.42 HUD’s 
Drug Elimination Program (“DEP”), which provided financial support 
to public housing authorities in their efforts to combat drug problems, 
 
of Hous. And Urban Dev., Crime in Public Housing: A Review of 
Major Issues and Selected Crime Reduction Strategies iv–v 
(1978). 
37. See Rouse & Rubinstein, supra note 36, at 9–22. This focus on non-law 
enforcement strategies may have developed because previous research did 
not demonstrate that an increased police presence reduced crime. See 
Oscar Newman & Susan A. Franck, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, 
Factors Influencing Crime and Instability in Urban Housing 
Developments 140 (1980). 
38. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime 
Program First Annual Report to Congress 16–17 (Mar. 31, 1980), 
microformed on Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv. (Nat’l Inst. of 
Justice) (describing federal efforts to provide funding for police in public 
housing). 
39. Terence Dunworth & Aaron Saiger, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, 
Drugs and Crime in Public Housing: A Three-City Analysis 6 
(1994); Susan J. Popkin et al., The Hidden War: Crime and the 
Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago 29 (2000). 
40. Deborah Lamm Weisel, Police Exec. Research Forum, Tackling 
Drug Problems in Public Housing: A Guide for Police (1990). 
41. Id. at 101–02 (describing efforts in this category in Philadelphia, Pa.; New 
Orleans, La.; Baltimore, Md.; Orlando, Fla.; Tampa, Fla.; Atlanta, Ga; 
Newport News, Va.; New Brunswick, N.J.; Alexandria, Va.; and Monette, 
Ariz.). 
42. Popkin et al., supra note 39, at 29. 
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helped fund some of these efforts.43 In stark contrast to prior HUD 
programs, the overwhelming focus of DEP was an increased law 
enforcement presence in public housing.44 
Perhaps the most notorious example of 1990s-era aggressive 
practices occurred in Chicago. There, the Chicago Housing Authority 
and Chicago Police Department implemented Operation Clean Sweep, 
which involved “surprise searches of apartments, typically conducted 
before dawn, in which a team of law enforcement officers would 
furtively enter a single high-rise without search warrants to locate 
gangs, criminals, unreported household boarders, and illicit 
paraphernalia.”45 After legal challenges brought by the ACLU, the 
sweeps were severely limited and replaced with building-specific 
patrols.46 Ultimately, after spending hundreds of millions of dollars, the 
program was regarded as a failure.47 That said, it did inspire the 
exploration and in some cases implementation of similar programs in 
other major cities.48 It also spurred a national conversation about crime 
control tactics in public housing. President Clinton ordered HUD and 
the Justice Department to develop a plan to combat crime in public 
housing.49 Six of the seven points involved expanded authority to search 
 
43. Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program, supra note 
9, at 416–17. 
44. Theodore M. Hammett et al., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban 
Dev., Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource 
Document Final Report ii, 33 (1994) (reporting that 47 percent of 
DEP funds were dedicated to law enforcement activities, compared to 6 
percent each for physical improvements and drug treatment, and 4 
percent for resident initiatives); id. at 38 (identifying “police patrol” as 
among the top five most commonly cited activities funded through DEP). 
45. Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Rise and Fall of a Modern 
Ghetto 130 (2000). 
46. Popkin et al., supra note 39, at 33. 
47. Id. at 175–76. 
48. David E.B. Smith, Note, Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Constitutional 
Issues in Chicago’s Public Housing Sweeps, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 505, 
506–07 & nn.9–13 (1993) (noting that “sweep programs were considered 
or instituted in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, 
Nashville, Detroit, Seattle, Des Moines, Annapolis, and Marquette, 
Michigan”). 
49. William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address (Apr. 16, 1994), 
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219057 
[https://perma.cc/G37E-UAR5]); see also Ronald Brownstein, Frisk for 
Guns at Housing Projects, Panel Urges, L.A. Times (Apr. 13, 1994), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-13/news/mn-45548_1_housing-projects 
[https://perma.cc/3ZCF-S4LN] (discussing the proposed plan); Lynn 
Sweet, Clinton Unveils Tailored 7-Point Sweeps Policy, Chi. Sun Times, 
Apr. 17, 1994, at 3 (describing the president’s new policy). 
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apartments and people in public housing, such as an increased use of 
stop-and-frisk and warrantless “consent searches” of apartments.50 
Less high profile were the efforts like those of the Metropolitan 
Police Department’s new Public Housing Division in Washington D.C. 
There, the police department instituted several problem-oriented 
strategies to address issues that it deemed to be particular to public 
housing.51 For example, Operation Bark & Bite focused on public 
housing residents’ ownership of dogs, particularly pit bulls, which 
intimidated residents and were used in fights for gambling.52 In part 
because public housing tenants’ leases barred dog ownership, the Public 
Housing Division was able to issue citations to residents and impound 
animals, as well as patrol buildings with housing authority staff 
members who had access to apartments.53 Although this example does 
not involve the typical crime conditions associated with public housing 
in the popular imagination, it provides a good example of the expansive 
tools and authority that police can put to use when they target public 
housing. 
And, although public housing usually receives outsized attention 
regarding crime, private buildings also became a focus of policing 
efforts. For example, in New York City, the Manhattan District 
Attorney launched the Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”) in 1990.54 
Later expanded to the entire city under the title “Operation Clean 
Halls,” the NYPD receives permission from private landlords to patrol 
the common areas of apartment buildings.55 The original focus of the 
program was “narcotics sales taking place in the common areas of 
private buildings, such as lobbies, stairwells, and rooftops.”56 It later 
expanded to include other criminal activity and quality of life offenses 
in the buildings.57 Such programs are effectively unregulated and no 
comprehensive listing of them exists. Cases alleging improper arrests or 
 
50. Sweet, supra note 49.  
51. Joshua Ederheimer, Complex Crime: Contending with Crime in Public 
Housing, in 3 Problem Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific 
Problems, Critical Issues, and Making POP Work, at x (Corina 
Sole & Eugenia E. Gratto eds., 2000). 
52. Id. at 9. 
53. Id. at 10–11. 
54. Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 517. 
57. Id. at 517–19. 
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other encounters between residents or their guests suggest that this 
practice extends beyond New York City.58 
Aside from these policing strategies heralded by police departments, 
HUD, and local governments, police programs and practices targeted 
at public and patrolled housing have also come to light through 
investigations and lawsuits challenging them. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division found in recent 
investigations that the Baltimore and Newark police departments 
singled out public housing residents for arrest and citation. The 
Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) concentrated on public housing 
for trespassing enforcement, resulting in unconstitutional arrests.59 At 
least one BPD district even used a template for processing trespassing 
arrests in public housing,60 presumably to make them easier. 
Astonishingly, the template’s section for an arrestee’s demographic 
information was pre-filled with the words “black male,” thus 
“presum[ing] that individuals arrested for trespassing will be African 
American.”61 In Newark, the Justice Department identified complaints 
that the police department focused on public housing projects as 
“convenient targets” for citations for quality of life infractions.62 
Numerous courts have also weighed in on these targeted practices 
as a result of constitutional challenges brought by residents and their 
guests. Public housing residents in Frederick, Maryland brought a 
lawsuit charging that the local police department, which had entered 
an agreement with the public housing authority, was illegally arresting 
people for trespassing.63 After advising residents to “carry their photo 
identification with them at all times to display to police,” the housing 
authority maintained a “trespass log” to document those who had been 
issued trespassing citations, i.e., “[p]ersons believed to be at one of the 
Apartments with ‘no apparent legitimate reason.’”64 If persons listed on 
the log were encountered again on the grounds of the public housing 
 
58. See, e.g., Franklin v. Montgomery Cty., Md., No. DKC 2005–0489, 2006 
WL 2632298, at *7–8 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2006) (describing police 
department’s authority to patrol private housing complex); L.D.L. v. 
State, 569 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Holland 
v. Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d 145, 145–46 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
59. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the 
Baltimore City Police Dep’t 37–38 (2016). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 37. 
62. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the 
Newark Police Department 21 (2014). 
63. Diggs v. Hous. Auth. of Frederick, 67 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524–25 (D. Md. 
1999). 
64. Id. at 525–26. 
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apartments, they were arrested solely because their name appeared on 
the trespass log.65 Residents and visitors have challenged similar 
trespass enforcement practices used in public and patrolled housing 
complexes in Ohio, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, and 
Washington.66 In East Chicago, Indiana, a public housing resident sued 
because, pursuant to a relationship between the public housing 
authority and police department, the police routinely entered 
apartments with drug-sniffing dogs to conduct searches.67 
Pending cases in Buffalo and Oakland raise constitutional questions 
about policing practices in public housing as well. A public housing 
resident in Oakland, along with his frequent guest, have challenged the 
Oakland Housing Authority Police Department’s (“OHAPD”) practice 
of stopping, questioning, and searching public housing residents and 
their guests without suspicion under the guise of enforcing an 
unconstitutionally vague loitering ordinance.68 The lead plaintiff was 
named in at least sixty-three incident reports reflecting stops or 
interactions with OHAPD officers between 2011 and 2017.69 OHAPD 
incident reports indicate that officers routinely conduct warrant and 
records checks of people they accuse of loitering, and officers often 
handcuff them as well.70 Officers also frequently request that the 
housing authority’s legal counsel review residents’ leases for possible 
 
65. Id. at 526. 
66. See Brown v. Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth., No. C-3-93-037, 1993 WL 
1367433 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 1993); State ex rel. X.B., 952 A.2d 521 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Holland v. Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d 145, 
145–46 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (describing the Leesburg, Virginia police 
department’s agreement with a federally-subsidized apartment complex 
so that it would have power to “issue barment notices to unauthorized 
individuals present on the . . . property”); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 
51 P.3d 733 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (describing fiancés of two public 
housing tenants in Bremerton, Washington suit against the police 
department because they were ticketed or arrested for trespassing multiple 
times as a result of the public housing authority’s trespassing policy, 
which gave the police department authority to issue barment notices to 
nonresidents); Kimberly E. O’Leary, Dialogue, Perspective and Point of 
View as Lawyering Method: A New Approach to Evaluating Anti-Crime 
Measures in Subsidized Housing, 49 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 
133, 134 n.4 (1996) (describing aggressive arrest practices in public 
housing in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and St. Michaels, Maryland). 
67. Gutierrez v. City of East Chicago, No. 2:16-CV-111-JVB-PRC, 2016 WL 
5819818 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 2016). 
68. Complaint at 10–12, Mathieu v. City of Oakland, No. 18-cv-5742 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 19, 2018). 
69. Id. at 13. 
70. See id. at Exhibits. B, F, H, N, T, X. 
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eviction.71 Groups of all sizes have drawn OHAPD attention, including 
a gathering following a funeral.72 
In Buffalo, a local Black Lives Matter group filed a complaint with 
the New York Attorney General that accused the Buffalo Police 
Department’s housing unit of engaging in unconstitutional trespass 
enforcement policies, including trespass “sweeps” and checkpoints that 
resulted in unconstitutional arrests in and around public housing 
complexes.73 A federal lawsuit filed in 2018 further alleges that the 
housing unit has played an outsized role in the Buffalo Police 
Department’s policy and practice of utilizing unconstitutional 
checkpoints for crime control purposes.74 That unit writes 
approximately one third of the traffic tickets issued by the entire police 
department.75 
In sum, public and patrolled housing have received special attention 
from police departments for decades. For public housing in particular, 
federal funding has driven some of this attention, which has taken 
varying forms, but appears to have focused in more recent years on 
aggressive order maintenance strategies. These targeted programs have 
persisted even as traditional public housing has been on the decline in 
recent years. 
B. Hot Spots Policing 
The rise of policing targeted at public and patrolled housing in 
recent decades has coincided with a newfound emphasis on hot spots 
policing. Indeed, hot spots policing has become wildly popular across 
the United States76 and is often called for as an element of “smart 
 
71. See id. at Exhibits. H & X. 
72. Id. at Exhibit. J. 
73. Anjana Malhotra, Unchecked Authority without 
Accountability in Buffalo, New York: The Buffalo Police 
Department’s Widespread Pattern and Practice of 
Unconstitutional Discriminatory Policing, and the Human, 
Social and Economic Costs 15–16 (2017). 
74. Complaint at 10–15, Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, 
No. 18-cv-00719-CCR (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (describing checkpoint 
practices). 
75. Id. at 17. 
76. See Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime; 
An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 Just. Q. 633, 634, 
636-37 (2014) [hereinafter Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing 
on Crime] (noting that a majority of American police departments use 
hot spots policing strategies and that of 192 police agencies surveyed in 
2008 by the Police Executive Research Forum, nine out of ten used hot 
spots strategies). As local news reports demonstrate, police departments 
both large and small have embraced its use. See Kochel, supra note 8, at 
359–62 (finding “almost exclusively positive press” about hot spots 
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policing.”77 Law enforcement’s eager adoption of hot spots policing has 
likely contributed to the targeting of public and patrolled housing for 
police programs. While police departments do not always utilize the 
term “hot spots policing” when identifying the place-based strategies 
they employ, it is fair to describe their enforcement strategies that zero 
in on particular locations as versions of hot spots policing.78 It is 
therefore useful to understand the concepts underlying hot spots 
policing in an examination of policing programs targeted at public and 
patrolled housing. 
Police agencies and criminologists have embraced the concept that 
problem places require special police attention for decades,79 but in the 
last thirty years, hot spots policing strategies have emerged as a favorite 
 
policing in review of Midwest media coverage between 1990 and 2005); 
see also, e.g., Phil Fairbanks, Erie County Gets $1.7 Million Grant to 
Fight Gun Violence, Buffalo News (July 7, 2016), https://buffalonews. 
com/2016/07/07/erie-county-gets-1-7-million-grant-to-fight-gun-violence/ 
[https://perma.cc/9YNQ-EKEZ] (describing hot spots policing to be one 
of two strategies funded by large grant); Tristan Hallman, More Dallas 
Police Officers Put on 911 Response Patrols, Dall. Morning News 
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2015/10/05/ 
more-dallas-police-officers-put-on-911-response-patrols [https://perma.cc/ 
5SQD-KJND] (noting that hot spot policing was a “major initiative” of 
Dallas police chief); Kim Bell, St. Louis Takes Another Shot at Hot-Spot 
Policing, St. Louis Post Dispatch (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www. 
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-takes-another-shot-at-hot- 
spot-policing/article_b71de858-3780-5498-99ba-5939e85777c4.html [https:// 
perma.cc/632Z-4JZ2] (describing “new rounds” of hot-spot policing, 
described by the St. Louis police chief as one of his department’s “core 
principles”); Maxine Bernstein, Portland City Council Accepts Federal 
Grant to Help Police Study 15-Minute Hot Spot Policing, Oregonian 
(Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2014/11/portland_ 
city_council_accepts.html [https://perma.cc/W8BC-GB25] (describing a 
federal grant to Portland police department to study new hot spots 
policing program). 
77. James R. Coldren, Jr. et al., Introducing Smart Policing: Foundations, 
Principles, and Practice, 16 Police Q. 275 (2013) (describing the 
development of smart policing). 
78. The NYPD is a good example of a police department that has used hot 
spots strategies without labeling them as such. See generally David 
Weisburd et al., Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the 
New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police 
Strength?: The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing 
Strategy, 31 Just. Q. 129 (2014) (concluding that the NYPD’s Operation 
Impact, which involved the focused use of stop and frisk in “Impact 
Zones,” was a hot spots strategy). 
79. Fagan et al., supra note 19, at 472–73 (describing criminological emphasis 
on place dating to the 1920s). 
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tool to combat crime and disorder.80 The basic concept underlying hot 
spots policing is “the application of police interventions at very small 
geographic units of analysis,”81 such as “buildings or addresses, block 
faces or street segments, or clusters of addresses, block faces and street 
segments.”82 
But hot spots policing is not one-size-fits-all. Instead, police 
departments may use any policing strategy—order maintenance, 
community policing, or problem-oriented policing—to implement hot 
spots policing. David Weisburd, a criminologist who pioneered the 
concept of hot spots policing, describes the variety of approaches as 
follows: 
There is no single way to implement hot spots policing. 
Approaches can range rather dramatically across interventions. 
For example, strategies of hot spots policing are often based 
simply on drastically increasing officer time spent at hot spots, as 
was the case in the Minneapolis, Minnesota, Hot Spots Patrol 
Experiment. But hot spots policing can also employ much more 
complex interventions to do something about crime problems. In 
the Jersey City, New Jersey, Drug Market Analysis Program 
Experiment, for example, a three-step program (including 
identifying and analyzing problems, developing tailored 
responses, and maintaining crime control gains) was used to 
reduce problems at drug hot spots. Also in Jersey City, in the 
Jersey City POP Experiment, a problem-oriented policing 
approach was taken in developing a specific strategy for each of 
the violent crime hot spots.83 
Thus, some police agencies have consciously employed an order 
maintenance approach and increased enforcement actions, e.g., stops, 
arrests, and tickets, as part of their hot spots strategies, while others 
have focused on community policing and problem-oriented policing 
strategies.84 
 
80. Braga, supra note 14, at 13 (“[C]rime is not evenly distributed across 
urban areas; rather, it is concentrated in very small places, or hot spots, 
that generate half of all criminal events.”). 
81. Braga & Weisburd, supra note 29, at 9. 
82. Braga, supra note 14, at 13. 
83. David Weisburd, Does Hot Spots Policing Inevitably Lead to Unfair and 
Abusive Police Practices, or Can We Maximize Both Fairness and 
Effectiveness in the New Proactive Policing?, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 661, 
667 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
84. See Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, supra note 
76, at 642–43, 644–51 tbl.2 (describing interventions used in nineteen hot 
spots policing programs). 
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For example, the Houston Police Department utilized a 
combination of approaches in its “Targeted Beat Program.”85 All of the 
department’s participating substations initially used order maintenance 
strategies and some altered their strategies over time.86 In one where 
public housing was concentrated officers began by saturating particular 
beats with officers, and ultimately settled on “targeting apartment 
complexes and the disproportionate amount of calls being generated by 
a small number of complexes.”87 Officers spent the majority of their 
time “in high crime areas or doing apartment checks.”88 In one beat 
where public housing comprised 25 percent of the apartment units, the 
police department implemented a program to “take back the beat,” 
which involved “[c]rime sweeps through government housing and 
problem apartment complexes.”89 Consequently, officers in that beat 
spent close to 80 percent of their time patrolling public housing and 
private apartment buildings.90 In other beats, the use of stops, 
categorized separately from sweeps, was more prevalent.91 In one, over 
70 percent of stops led to arrests or the issuance of summonses, 
including for “walking on the wrong side of the street” or similarly 
minor offenses.92 Other departments have also utilized order 
maintenance strategies in their pursuit of driving down crime in hot 
spots.93 
 
85. Tory J. Caeti, Houston’s Targeted Beat Program: A Quasi-Experimental 
Test of Police Patrol Strategies (May 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Sam Houston State University) (on file with author). 
86. Id. at 188. 
87. Id. at 115, 189. 
88. Id. at 213. The study did not define “apartment checks.” 
89. Id. at 116, 190–91. The published study of the Houston Police 
Department’s program did not provide details describing the tactics used 
during the sweeps. 
90. Id. at 211. 
91. It is hard to imagine that the sweeps of apartment buildings did not 
involve frequent stops of people encountered in and around them, but the 
study categorized stops as a different tactic. See id. at 210–18. 
92. Id. at 218. 
93. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent 
Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 Criminology 
541, 554–55 (1999) (describing Jersey City hot spots experiments in which 
“aggressive order maintenance” tactics, including “dispersing groups of 
loiterers, issuing a summons for public drinking, and ‘stop and frisks’ of 
suspicious persons”); Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects 
of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12 
Just. Q. 673, 677 (1995) (describing that hot spots strategies included 
conducting “field interrogations in gun crime hot spots”). 
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In contrast, hot spots policing can also utilize a problem-oriented 
policing model. Examples in Jacksonville and Boston demonstrate that 
police departments can make environmental changes to reduce the 
prevalence of crime in hot spots. Rather than focusing on code 
enforcement, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Department made lighting 
improvements and fencing repairs, and consulted with business owners 
and rental property managers about security measures.94 The Boston 
Police Department made similar environmental changes in a hot spot 
and also worked with a local high school whose students were targeted 
for robberies to bring attention to the crime problem.95 
Leading criminologists who study hot spots policing tend to be 
strong advocates for the problem-oriented policing approach.96 Yet, the 
order maintenance methodology appears to be ubiquitous among the 
police departments that utilize hot spots strategies.97 And, as the 
Houston example demonstrates, hot spots practices are sometimes 
directed towards public and patrolled housing as part of larger 
programs. 
 
94. Bruce Taylor et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Different Policing 
Strategies at Hot Spots of Violent Crime, 7 J. Experimental 
Criminology 149, 158 (2011). 
95. Anthony A. Braga & Cory Schnell, Evaluating Place-Based Policing 
Strategies: Lessons Learned from the Smart Policing Initiative in Boston, 
16 Police Q. 339, 348–50 (2013). 
96. For example, in their recent book on hot spots policing, Anthony Braga 
and David Weisburd made clear that they think problem-oriented policing 
is a better approach for hot spots policing, particularly in light of the costs 
that zero tolerance strategies can impose: 
We believe that how police address crime hot spots matters. Police 
officers should strive to use problem-oriented policing and 
situational crime prevention techniques to address the place 
dynamics, situations, and characteristics that cause a “spot” to be 
“hot.” We also make the point that the strategies used to police 
problem places can have more or less desirable effects on police-
community relations. Particularly in minority neighborhoods 
where residents have long suffered from elevated crime problems 
and historically poor police service, police officers should make an 
effort to develop positive and collaborative relationships with 
residents and not engage in strategies that will undermine the 
legitimacy of police agencies, such as indiscriminant enforcement 
tactics. 
 Braga & Weisburd, supra note 29, at 4–5. 
97. Kochel, supra note 8, at 365 (finding that review of criminological 
scholarship on hot spots and review of Midwest media on hot spots 
programs found “little or no mention” of problem-oriented strategies, but 
instead “most hot spots approaches appeared to be enforcement-oriented, 
including directed patrol, saturation of an area with police presence, or 
zero tolerance of order maintenance violations”). 
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In sum, public and patrolled housing are often subject to significant 
scrutiny from law enforcement agencies, both because police 
departments develop programs that explicitly target them and because 
they sometimes deploy hot spots strategies in those locales. Some of the 
attention public and patrolled housing receive from police is rooted in 
genuine concern about crime conditions, but in some cases it results 
from presumptions and prejudice against those places and the people 
who live in and frequent them. Consequently, the residents and visitors 
of public and patrolled housing are often subject to outsized police 
attention. Moreover, police departments have consciously decided to 
use their unique access to public and patrolled housing to execute 
targeted and hot spots strategies. 
In light of limited Fourth Amendment protections, which are 
described in detail in Part II, programs that target public and patrolled 
housing can result in police surveillance and control of law-abiding 
people who live in or frequent public and patrolled housing. Under the 
auspices of programs that are ostensibly designed to protect and serve 
the residents of public and patrolled housing, the Fourth Amendment 
operates to permit widespread stops, arrests, and searches of people 
who engage in behavior, often innocuous, that is either not criminalized 
in other places or simply never subject to police oversight. 
II. The Fourth Amendment in Public and Patrolled 
Housing 
The Fourth Amendment’s usual protection for the home is 
unrecognizable in public and patrolled housing. Although scholars have 
long acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment offers limited 
protection for those who live in urban areas where their daily lives are 
more exposed to public view than their wealthy counterparts’, the 
Fourth Amendment rights of residents of public and patrolled housing 
are uniquely circumscribed. What powers do police have when they 
execute targeted and hot spots strategies in public and patrolled 
housing? Just about any they can dream up outside the doors of 
individual apartments. 
As noted above, the home has such an exalted status that one 
scholar has described a “cult of the home” in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.98 This cult, however, is much more welcoming to private 
homes than to apartments. With regard to searches, government agents 
are typically required to procure warrants before searching private 
homes,99 including the curtilage—the “area around the home to which 
 
98. See Stern, supra note 1, at 912–18 (describing Fourth Amendment 
protection for the home). 
99. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752–54 (1984). A major exception 
to this rule is the authority to search welfare recipients’ homes. See Jordan 
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the activity of home life extends.”100 An enclosed backyard of a house 
is the paradigmatic example of curtilage.101 In the same vein, police may 
not enter homes to make arrests absent exigent circumstances.102 There 
are many fewer restrictions on searches and seizures in “public” places, 
where arrests may generally take place without warrants,103 and 
searches may be permissible if there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.104 In the context of apartment buildings and other multi-unit 
dwellings, the warrant requirement extends to the interiors of 
apartments, but typically not to the common areas of such buildings. 
 
C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional 
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 Ind. L.J. 355, 359–73 
(2010) (describing supposed “special status of the home” in the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the “competing narrative” of treatment of 
homes of the poor); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 
99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 697–708 (2009) (describing decades-
long judicial approval of home searches of public assistance recipients). 
100. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). The Court has 
developed a four-factor test for identifying curtilage: (1) “the proximity 
of the area . . . to the home”; (2) “whether the area is included [in] an 
enclosure surrounding the home”; (3) “the nature of the uses to which the 
area is put”; and (4) “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area 
from observation by people passing by.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
294, 301 (1987). Because curtilage “has been considered part of the home 
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement applies to searches of curtilage in the same way it 
applies to the home. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
101. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–13 (1986) (noting that 
enclosed backyard “immediately adjacent to a suburban home, 
surrounded by high double fences,” with “close nexus to the home” was 
part of home’s curtilage). Determining whether a particular area 
constitutes curtilage is a fact-intensive inquiry, which has led to disparate 
results. See LaFave, supra note 2, § 2.3(d) (collecting examples of 
structures and areas found to be curtilage (or not)). 
102. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213–14 (1981) (holding that, 
absent exigent circumstances or consent, a search warrant is required to 
search a third party’s home for the subject of an arrest warrant); Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to 
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment 
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a 
warrant.”). 
103. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (upholding the 
warrantless arrest of a defendant who stood at the threshold of her house 
because she was in a “‘public’ place”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 
411, 423–24 (1976) (upholding a warrantless arrest in a public place). 
104. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”). 
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Those spaces are deemed public, and courts largely have held that 
apartment dwellers cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
them.105 This comparatively restrictive definition of the home applies to 
rich and poor alike; the hallways of buildings where apartments cost 
millions are likely not curtilage, just as they are not in public housing. 
But other unique characteristics of the way Fourth Amendment law 
operates in public and patrolled housing leads to the differential 
treatment of its residents. Thus, despite the special status of the home, 
the Fourth Amendment does not provide the freedom of movement, 
privacy, autonomy, or dignity to residents of public and patrolled 
housing that most Americans expect. 
The primary source of the extraordinary police power in and around 
public and patrolled housing is the astounding breadth of state and 
local laws and rules that regulate and often criminalize conduct in those 
locations. Devon Carbado has described this phenomenon more 
generally as “mass criminalization”: “the criminalization of relatively 
nonserious behavior or activities and the multiple ways in which 
criminal justice actors, norms, and strategies shape welfare state 
processes and policies.”106  
There are several methods by which mass criminalization in public 
and patrolled housing is achieved. Some states and localities enact 
restrictions by statute or ordinance that are specific to public housing. 
The paradigmatic examples are statutes that specifically bar drug 
possession or sale in public housing.107 In addition, some local housing 
authorities and private landlords require compliance with specific terms 
of conduct in leases signed by tenants or in house rules incorporated 
into leases by reference, which law enforcement officers are empowered 
to enforce.108 Further, quality of life laws of general application 
 
105. See Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and Curtilage: What Jardines Teaches 
and What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1289, 1303–05 (2015) 
(reviewing post-2000 cases on whether common areas of multi-unit 
apartment buildings constitute curtilage and concluding that “the 
overwhelming weight of authority rejects the proposition that a resident 
of a multi-dwelling residential building can claim curtilage protection in 
common areas—or even anywhere outside an individual unit”). 
106. Carbado, supra note 12, at 1487. 
107. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-278a(b) (West 2019); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 893.13(1)(f) (West 2018); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:35-7.1(a) 
(West 2019). 
108. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 399 F.3d 750, 751–52 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(describing an agreement between the public housing authority of Inskter, 
Michigan and the local police department); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 
51 P.3d 733, 735 n.1 (Wash. 2002) (describing Bremerton Housing 
Authority’s exclusion policy); L.D.L. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing policy of a “low-rent federally subsidized 
housing project” that provided authority to Tallahassee Police 
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addressing a wide range of subjects—noise ordinances, jaywalking, 
smoking, open container, riding bicycles on sidewalks—are all 
enforceable in and around public and patrolled housing. The U.S. 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s description of the 
Ferguson, Missouri municipal code aptly captures the incredible 
breadth of conduct that is often regulated by local authorities—ranging 
from “Manner of Walking in Roadway” to the height of grass and 
weeds.109 As a result, police officers have a plethora of tools at their 
disposal when they determine that they want to conduct a stop, arrest, 
or “voluntary” encounter on the grounds of public or patrolled housing. 
Two examples from New York illustrate how both laws specific to 
housing and laws of general application create mass criminalization in 
public and patrolled housing. The New York Penal Law specifically 
criminalizes trespassing in public housing developments.110 When a 
person enters or remains on the premises of a public housing 
development despite a “housing officer or other person in charge” 
having “personally communicated” a request to leave, they have 
committed criminal trespass.111 A person also commits criminal trespass 
when they enter or remain on the premises of a public housing 
development in violation of “conspicuously posted rules or regulations 
governing entry and use thereof.”112 Thus, law enforcement officers have 
unique powers in public housing to expel people at will, followed by the 
pain of arrest for failure to comply. Remarkably, even public housing 
residents become criminals when they are present in spaces of their own 
buildings that are deemed off limits.113 Laws of general application that 
are only enforced in certain locations also play a role. For example, 
 
Department to “issue no trespass warnings and/or to arrest any persons 
loitering on the property who are not residents”). 
109. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the 
Ferguson Police Department 7 (2015) (“[T]he code establishes 
housing violations, such as High Grass and Weeds; requirements for 
permits to rent an apartment or use the City’s trash service; animal 
control ordinances, such as Barking Dog and Dog Running at Large; and 
a number of other violations, such as Manner of Walking in Roadway.”) 
(citing Ferguson, Mo. Code of Ordinances §§ 29-16, 37-1, 46-27, 6-
5, 6-11, 44-344 (2018)); see also Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal 
Law of Municipal Governance, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1409 (2001) (describing 
the authority of municipal governments to enact criminal laws and the 
breadth of such laws). 
110. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e), (f) (McKinney 2019). 
111. § 140.10(f). 
112. § 140.10(e). 
113. See infra notes 249–251 and accompanying text (recounting the arrest of 
a public housing resident and his guest because of their presence on his 
building’s roof landing). 
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smoking is banned in the common areas of apartment buildings in New 
York City with three or more units and failure to comply with this law 
can result in citation.114 But this offense is likely to result in a police 
encounter only in buildings where police officers have a regular 
presence. Thus, mass criminalization operates uniquely in public and 
patrolled housing to expose residents and others in and around those 
locations to the criminal justice system. 
In combination with the intensity of police attention to public and 
patrolled housing through targeted and hot spots strategies, mass 
criminalization results in the Fourth Amendment offering 
extraordinarily limited protection to those who live in and frequent 
public and patrolled housing. Three doctrines are particularly 
important in understanding this dynamic. First, police officers have 
virtually limitless authority to stop people in and around public and 
patrolled housing because of the breadth of conduct regulated in those 
places, the very low standard for conducting stops on suspicion of 
noncriminal infractions, and the frequent labeling of public and 
patrolled housing as high-crime areas. Second, the Supreme Court 
created extraordinarily broad arrest authority when it determined that 
the Fourth Amendment did not bar arrests for very minor crimes—
even ones for which arrest is not permitted under state law. This makes 
violators of the uniquely broad sets of regulations in public and 
patrolled housing subject to arrest for astonishingly minor misbehavior. 
Third, the search incident to arrest doctrine leaves those who frequent 
locations targeted by place-based policing programs especially 
vulnerable to invasive searches. Numerous courts have interpreted this 
exception to permit searches whenever there is probable cause to 
arrest—even when an arrest has not taken place. 
Taken together, these doctrines leave residents of public and 
patrolled housing uniquely vulnerable to police surveillance and control. 
They may be stopped, arrested, and searched for almost anything. As 
a result, when police utilize targeted and hot spots policing strategies, 
particularly the order maintenance variety, only the interiors of their 
apartments provide sanctuary. In short, the substantial privacy and 
dignitary interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are effectively 
dead letters in public and patrolled housing. 
A. Stop for Anything 
The power to stop people on the basis of a relatively low level of 
suspicion for even minor infractions is the cornerstone of the targeted 
policing practices utilized in public and patrolled housing. As explained 
in Part I, all manner of law enforcement personnel patrol public and 
patrolled housing, e.g., special departments, units, and regular patrols, 
including those tasked with enforcing hot spots strategies. When they  
114. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 17-503(a)(13), 17-508(d), 17-508(e) (2018). 
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do, there is little they must see to justify approaching a person, 
questioning them about their conduct, and temporarily detaining 
them.115 The standard for stops announced by the Supreme Court in 
Terry v. Ohio116 is by now familiar: reasonable suspicion, based on 
articulable facts, that an individual is involved in criminal activity.117 
Numerous problems with this standard are widely recognized, ranging 
from the derogation of the probable cause standard118 to its failure to 
acknowledge the role of race in identifying suspicious behavior.119 But 
when police focus their attention on public and patrolled housing, Terry 
operates to expose residents to almost unbridled power to detain and 
question residents, their guests, and others who are legitimately present. 
Two doctrinal areas are particularly important for understanding how 
and why police officers have such extraordinary power: the permission 
to stop for noncriminal infractions and the notion that presence in a 
high-crime area contribute to reasonable suspicion. 
1. Stops for Infractions, Regulations, and House Rules 
When enforcing the wide variety of laws, rules, and regulations that 
govern conduct in and around public and patrolled housing, the Fourth 
Amendment requires a very low level of suspicion to initiate a stop. As 
with stops made on suspicion of criminal activity, courts typically 
require only reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain people on 
suspicion of noncriminal infractions.120 Although some states have  
115. Of course, “voluntary” and “consensual” encounters in which a reasonable 
person would feel free to leave are not stops and therefore not subject to 
Fourth Amendment regulation at all. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 
U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (“[T]he police can be said to have seized an individual 
‘only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
116. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
117. Id. at 30. 
118. See Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 50–
56 (2016). 
119. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 6; Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 6; Maclin, supra note 6; Thompson, supra note 6. 
120. See, e.g., In re A.J., 63 A.3d 562 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding a stop for 
truancy); State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1986) (same for public 
intoxication); State v. Dumas, 786 So. 2d 80 (La. 2001) (same for a city 
ordinance prohibiting walking in a roadway); People v. McNutt, No. 
313621, 2014 WL 1510118, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (same for a 
suspected noise ordinance violation); City of Devil’s Lake v. Lawrence, 
639 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 2002) (same for disorderly conduct); State v. 
Morris, 641 P.2d 77 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (same for curfew law); State v. 
Iverson, 871 N.W.2d 661 (Wis. 2015) (same for littering). Similarly, it has 
long been clear that law enforcement officers need only have reasonable 
suspicion to make noncriminal traffic stops. See Jordan Blair Woods, 
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specifically cabined stop authority so that officers may conduct stops 
only when they suspect misdemeanors or felonies, this appears to be a 
minority position.121 Accordingly, an encounter with a police officer that 
the subject cannot end may lead to an arrest, a search, or other 
significant disruption. 
Law enforcement officers’ use of the broad range of regulated 
conduct in public and patrolled housing is analogous to the utilization 
of America’s many traffic laws to initiate car stops on roads and 
highways. As David Harris has observed in that context, “the 
comprehensive scope of state traffic codes makes them extremely 
powerful tools . . . . These codes regulate the details of driving in ways 
both big and small, obvious and arcane . . . . [N]o driver can avoid 
violating some traffic law during a short drive, even with the most 
careful attention.”122 The same is true in public and patrolled housing, 
where the banalities of daily life—ball playing, the placement of BBQ 
grills, the size of pets, and rollerblading—are subject to rules and 
regulations and provide opportunities for stops.123 
In light of this wide breadth of regulated conduct and the low 
quantum of suspicion required to initiate them, the risk that police will 
 
Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA 
L. Rev. 672, 711–13, 713 & n.181 (2015) (collecting cases and concluding 
that “most courts now use a reasonable suspicion standard to evaluate 
the state and federal constitutionality of police initiations of routine traffic 
stops,” although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided the 
appropriate standard for traffic stops). 
121. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2016) (allowing 
stops for only felonies or misdemeanors identified in the New York Penal 
Law); Brazwell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 499 (Ark. 2003) (holding that a stop 
made on suspicion of loitering unlawful); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 
N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011) (holding that a suspected violation of a nontraffic 
civil infraction does not justify an investigatory stop); State v. Duncan, 
43 P.3d 513, 517 (Wash. 2015) (same). 
122. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: 
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 544, 545 (1997). 
123. The wide array of regulations governing conduct is arguably even broader 
than written because mistakes of law by police officers will typically be 
forgiven. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (holding that 
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion even though the officer made 
a “reasonable” mistake of law underlying suspicion); Kit Kinports, Heien’s 
Mistake of Law, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 121, 168–74 (2016) (describing risk that 
Heien would be read to permit police officers to make mistakes of law, 
resulting in the upholding of searches and seizures in a variety of 
circumstances); cf. United States v. Davis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (pre-Heien, suppressing evidence revealed following a stop for 
walking in the roadway between two housing projects “known to be high 
crime areas” because officer was mistaken that law barred walking in 
roadways without sidewalks). 
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use minor misbehavior as pretext to stop is uniquely high in public and 
patrolled housing. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. 
United States,124 pretextual stops pose no Fourth Amendment problem. 
There, the Court sanctioned the car stop of two African American men 
in a “high drug area” for turning and failing to signal.125 The fact that 
the officers were in plainclothes and members of the Washington D.C. 
police department’s vice squad provided strong evidence that cracking 
down on traffic infractions was not the officers’ actual interest.126 The 
stopped men argued that the stop had been based on race and therefore 
violated the Fourth Amendment.127 The Court rejected this claim, 
holding that intentional race discrimination is irrelevant to Fourth 
Amendment inquiries and that as long as an officer can identify any 
legal violation as the basis for a stop, the Fourth Amendment’s 
demands have been met.128 Despite the legion of criticism that followed 
this decision,129 Whren stands, thus cementing the ability of police 
officers to conduct stops on virtually any basis—even if the underlying 
motivation is rooted in animus, stereotypes, or unproven order-
maintenance policing strategies. 
2. High-Crime Areas 
The second area of law that fuels stops in public and patrolled 
housing is the standardless high-crime area doctrine. In Brown v. 
Texas,130 the Supreme Court appeared to establish that one’s mere 
presence in a high-crime area could not be sufficient to articulate 
reasonable suspicion.131 There, police stopped, frisked, and arrested a 
man encountered in an alley in a “high drug problem area.”132 The 
initial encounter rested on only the supposition that the man’s presence 
 
124. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
125. Id. at 808. 
126. Id.  
127. Id. at 810–14. 
128. Id. at 813. 
129. See, e.g., Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, supra note 6 
(arguing that Whren permits race to be part of officer’s rationale as long 
as he does not say so); Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable 
but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of 
Whren v. United States, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 882, 884 & n.2 (2015) 
(collecting literature linking Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to racial 
profiling). 
130. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
131. Id. at 52. 
132. Id. at 49. 
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in an alley “‘looked suspicious.’”133 The Court unanimously rejected the 
proposition that such mere presence constituted reasonable suspicion, 
emphasizing the need for individualized suspicion that the targeted 
individual has engaged in criminal activity.134 Standing alone, this 
decision suggests that people who live in or frequent areas with 
reputations as problem places would be free from police interactions 
merely because of their presence in them. But later decisions rendered 
this decision, which de-linked problem places and the people who 
happen to be in them, a fallacy. 
The Court fatally undermined Brown in Illinois v. Wardlow.135 
There, the Court held that the “relevant characteristics of a location” 
may be used to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.136 Thus, 
one’s presence in a high-crime area is “among the relevant contextual 
considerations in a Terry analysis.”137 The stop at issue in Wardlow 
itself rested on two simple facts: the defendant’s presence in “an area 
known for heavy narcotics trafficking, [where] officers anticipated 
encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug 
customers and individuals serving as lookouts,”138 and the defendant’s 
“unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.”139 For the Supreme Court, 
these meager “facts” were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.140 
Scholars have rightly critiqued Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
about high-crime areas as effectively meaningless.141 There is no 
common definition of high-crime area, and courts use a variety of 
metrics to define them. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson and Damien 
Bernache aptly summarized the confusion as follows: 
 
133. Id. at 52. 
134. Id. (“The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug 
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself 
was engaged in criminal conduct . . . . [T]he appellant’s activity was no 
different from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood.”). 
135. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 




140. Id. at 24–25.  
141. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-
Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence 
for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1587 (2008); Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the 
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating 
Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99 (1999). 
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[S]ome courts have defined a high-crime area as an area of 
“expected criminal activity,” which fits within the language of 
Wardlow. Other courts have described it as an area known for 
drug activity, or one under surveillance. Still other courts have 
held that a high-crime area is one that is “riddled with narcotics 
dealings and drug-related shootings.” Some courts have found 
that a “crime wave” can create a high-crime area. Being an area 
which is “notorious” or has a reputation for illegal conduct can 
also qualify an area as high-crime. Areas “plagued by gang-related 
shootings, drug dealing, assaults, and robberies” may also be 
termed high-crime areas. . . . . How does one know one is in a 
high-crime area? How is the determination that a location is a 
high-crime area made? These questions are still unanswered.142 
The NYPD provides a good example of the meaninglessness of this 
term. It trains its officers that high-crime area could refer to a building, 
a block, a sector within a precinct, or an entire county.143 
This definitional morass, in combination with a heavy reliance on 
officer testimony to identify high-crime areas,144 means, in practical 
terms, that whenever a police department identifies a hot spot or other 
problem location and subjects it to specialized policing strategies, a 
court will accept that it is a high-crime area. Unsurprisingly, the case 
law is littered with examples of courts identifying public and other 
patrolled housing as high-crime areas.145 This designation may be 
 
142. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141, at 1605–06 (footnotes omitted). 
143. See Transcript of Motion Hearing at 862–64, Ligon v. City of New York, 
No. 12-cv-2274 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012). 
144. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141, at 1607–08 (explaining that the 
majority of jurisdictions determine that a location is a high-crime area in 
reliance on officer testimony, although some require additional 
documentation or testimony to make the determination). 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Horne, 386 F. App’x 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding 
a defendant’s presence in a housing project in a high-crime area of Newark 
relevant to reasonable suspicion analysis); United States v. See, 574 F.3d 
309, 312 (6th Cir. 2009) (reiterating the district court findings that a 
Cuyahoga County public housing complex “has a reputation for illicit 
drug activity, domestic disturbances, robberies and assaults”); United 
States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing a Richmond, 
Virginia public housing project as a high-crime area); United States v. 
Martin, 399 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 2005) (same in Inkster, Michigan); United 
States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2002) (same in Nashville); 
United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing 
Dallas public housing complex as one with “a high incidence of drug 
transactions,” in part because of FBI intelligence reports “revealing . . . a 
high incidence of drug transactions”); United States v. Anderson, No. CR 
11-0938 SBA, 2012 WL 3309696 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2012) (same in 
Richmond, California); United States v. Williams, No. CR410-224, 2011 
WL 765728, at *3 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2011) (noting that numerous 
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especially likely for public and patrolled housing because of bias against 
such locales and the people that live there. As noted above, perceptions 
of disorder—and not necessarily actual levels of disorder—are strongly 
correlated with race and class.146 
Consequently, there is an automatic strike in favor of stopping 
people who find themselves in public or patrolled housing, including 
residents,147 that makes public and patrolled housing particularly 
attractive locations to police for stop activity.148 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Utah v. Strieff149 has amplified this dynamic. There, the 
Court refused to suppress the evidence gathered following an arrest 
made pursuant to a warrant check that resulted from a stop made 
without reasonable suspicion.150 It reasoned that the officer was merely 
“negligent” when he stopped a person without reasonable suspicion and 
conducted a warrant check, which revealed an outstanding arrest 
warrant for a traffic violation.151 This decision plainly incentivizes police 
to make suspicionless stops in places where they think they are likely 
to encounter people with outstanding warrants.152 Although the 
majority rejected the contention that its decision would result in 
“dragnet searches” by police because of the availability of civil liability 
 
federal cases established that public housing facilities in downtown 
Savannah, Georgia were “high crime area[s] where drug activity and the 
unlawful possession and use of firearms is commonplace”). 
146. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 23, at 336. 
147. Notably, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has not followed 
suit under its state criminal procedure law. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
945 N.E.2d 899, 907 (Mass. 2011) (holding a defendant’s presence on his 
own street could not be found suspicious even though police officers 
claimed that it was a high-crime area). 
148. Aziz Huq has made a similar observation with regard to areas of 
concentrated poverty generally. See Huq, supra note 9, at 2447–48, 2447 
& nn.235–36 (expounding on Stuntz’s observation that criminal procedure 
law creates “subsidies” for certain kinds of policing) (citing William J. 
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 781, 782 (2006); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 
Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1821 (1998)). 
149. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
150. Id. at 2064. 
151. Id. at 2060, 2063. 
152. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor described the prevalence of outstanding 
warrants. Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Outstanding warrants 
are surprisingly common . . . . The States and Federal Government 
maintain databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast 
majority of which appear to be for minor offenses.”). 
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against police departments that do so,153 the difficulty of establishing 
such liability makes this claim ring hollow.154 
Together, mass criminalization, the low standard for conducting 
stops on the basis of noncriminal infractions, and the high-crime area 
doctrine make stopping people in and around public and patrolled 
housing astonishingly easy. Identifying potential infractions is a simple 
task, and even when clear violations of the myriad rules and regulations 
governing life in public housing are not apparent, a law enforcement 
officer does not face a difficult challenge in articulating “reasonable 
suspicion” of some infraction when patrolling a high-crime area.155 And, 
when police have specific authority to enter the common areas of 
buildings that are typically not accessible to the public, the people they 
encounter in them—doing their laundry, checking their mail, taking out 
their garbage, and just going about their daily lives—may find 
themselves stopped and forced to account for their presence. 
B. Arrest for Anything 
Police also deploy arrest as a tool of control in public and patrolled 
housing. Courts typically embrace the notion that police use arrests to 
start criminal proceedings, but police have expansive authority to use 
arrests for virtually any purpose. As Rachel Harmon has pointed out, 
arrests serve a variety of purposes, e.g., to maintain order, to gather 
evidence, and to deter crime.156 These purposes—as well as patently 
illegitimate ones like asserting power or “Collars for Dollars” arrests 
that allow officers to accrue overtime157—are all on display in public 
and patrolled housing.  
153. Id. at 2064 (citing Monell. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
690 (1978)). 
154. See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 409, 
430 (2016) (arguing that municipalities effectively enjoy sovereign 
immunity because of the high causation standard for Section 1983 claims 
brought against them under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services). 
155. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141, at 1590–91. 
156. Harmon, Why Arrest?, supra note 9, at 333–59. Josh Bowers has similarly 
described the phenomenon of “non-law-enforcement searches and 
seizures” as being “without uniform purpose or objective,” with some 
being “mechanisms of ‘regulatory’ social control,” and “others of 
‘community caretaking.’” Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional 
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognizable Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 
66 Stan. L. Rev. 987, 1005 (2014). 
157. The “Collars for Dollars” phenomenon has been documented in several 
American cities. See, e.g., Alan Feuer & Joseph Goldstein, The Arrest 
Was a Bust. The Cops Got Overtime Anyway, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/nyregion/new-york-police-
overtime-pay-trial.html [https://perma.cc/8WNZ-CUD6] (describing the 
arrest of bodega cashier who alleged that NYPD officers arrested him only 
to pursue overtime and that it was a citywide practice); Lisa Getter et 
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The Fourth Amendment poses no barrier to these uses of arrest in 
public and patrolled housing because it asks only whether there was 
probable cause for some offense at the time of arrest.158 As with stops, 
given the wide range of rules and regulations that govern conduct 
within and around public and patrolled housing, arrests are very easy 
to produce. Accordingly, in public and patrolled housing, police utilize 
arrests in response to the most minor of offenses in the hallways, 
lobbies, and other common spaces.159 This practice undermines the 
sanctity of the home, which is usually protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.160 
Through two cases, the Supreme Court opened the door to police 
practices that utilize arrests for even very minor offenses: Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista,161 and Virginia v. Moore.162 In both, the Court 
approved arrests for unquestionably trivial acts: driving without a 
seatbelt and driving on a suspended license. Together, they signal that 
the Court is unbothered by the high costs of arrest and, more 
importantly, give law enforcement carte blanche to arrest for virtually 
anything. 
Atwater involved a proverbial “soccer mom”163 who was arrested for 
failing to seat belt herself and her children.164 After the initial stop, the 
officer “‘yell[ed]’ something to the effect of ‘[we]’ve met before’ and 
‘[y]ou’re going to jail.’”165 He also denied Atwater’s request to “take her 
‘frightened, upset, and crying’ children to a friend’s house nearby.”166 
He then arrested Atwater and transported her to a local police station, 
 
al., Innocent Caught in Web of Cops’ Overtime Abuse, Miami Herald 
(July 15, 1997, 11:17 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/ 
article1929039.html [https://perma.cc/44JN-LGBV] (describing practice 
in Miami); Peter Moskos, Collars for Dollars, Reason (June 29, 2011 
10:30 a.m.), http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/29/collars-for-dollars 
[https://perma.cc/96BK-RVNT] (describing practice in Baltimore). 
158. See discussion infra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.  
159. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation 
of the Baltimore City Police Dep’t 37–38 (2016); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Newark Police 
Department 21 (2014); Chase, supra note 105. 
160. Stern, supra note 1, at 912–16. 
161. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
162. 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
163. Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional 
Carte Blanche, 77 Ind. L.J. 419, 419 (2002). 
164. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323–24. 
165. Id. at 324 (alterations in original). 
166. Id. But, the Court noted “Atwater’s friend learned what was going on and 
soon arrived to take charge of the children.” Id. 
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where she was booked and held for “about one hour” before a bond 
hearing.167 The officer who arrested her did so even though the 
maximum punishment authorized by the Texas statute requiring seat 
belts was a $50 fine.168 
Although the Court recognized that “the physical incidents of arrest 
were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who 
was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment,”169 that did not stop 
it from adopting a bright-line rule for judging the propriety of arrests 
under the Fourth Amendment:  
[T]he standard of probable cause “applie[s] to all arrests, without 
the need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in 
particular situations.” . . . [Officers acting with probable cause 
are] authorized . . . to make a custodial arrest without balancing 
costs and benefits or determining whether or not [the] arrest was 
in some sense necessary.170  
That is, probable cause is sufficient to justify an arrest, regardless of 
the circumstances.171 In short, “probable cause means never having to 
give a reason.”172 
Seven years later, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court doubled down 
on its position that the Fourth Amendment poses no impediment to 
arrests for minor offenses. There, police arrested a driver “for the 
misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license, which is punishable 
under Virginia law by a year in jail and a $2,500 fine.”173 A search 
incident to arrest of the car revealed cash and a small amount of crack 
cocaine.174 Moore sought to suppress the cash and cocaine because 
 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 323 (citing Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.413(d) (West 1999)). 
169. Id. at 346–47. Unsurprisingly, Justice O’Connor’s dissent on behalf of four 
justices emphasized the majority’s recognition that the arrest was a 
“‘pointless indignity’ that served no discernible state interest.” Id. at 360 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. at 354 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). 
171. Although the Court allowed that “individualized review” is appropriate 
when an arrest “[i]s ‘conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually 
harmful to [the citizen’s] privacy or even physical interests,’” id. at 352–
53 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)), it did not 
explain what such circumstances might be. Given that the Atwater arrest 
involved probable cause for a minor offense punishable by only a fine, as 
well as “gratuitous humiliations,” id. at 346, it is difficult to think of a 
scenario that would now be deemed “extraordinary.” 
172. Bowers, supra note 156, at 1001. 
173. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 167 (2008). 
174. Id. 
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“[u]nder state law, the officers should have issued Moore a summons 
instead of arresting him.”175 Virginia’s explicit policy against arrest for 
this minor offense had no bearing on the reasonableness of the officer’s 
actions under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the majority reasoned 
that “[a] State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the 
range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more 
restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, 
and hence unconstitutional.”176 
Together, Atwater and Moore leave little doubt that arrests for 
even the most minor infractions—even noncriminal ones—will survive 
constitutional muster. Although some district courts have opined 
otherwise,177 the weight of authority supports arrests in such 
circumstances. This makes arrest readily available for use in public and 
patrolled housing. 
Remarkably, the Supreme Court expressed no concern about the 
costs of arrests. Instead, the Atwater majority “wonder[ed] whether 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention, and 
there [was] cause to the think the answer [was] no.”178 The evidence 
cited in support of this conclusion was that judicial review of whether 
there was probable cause to support any arrest is required within forty-
eight hours, that at least eight states had “more restrictive safeguards 
through statutes limiting warrantless arrests for minor offenses,” and 
“it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which 
carry costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason.”179 
Of course, the cited formal, legal safeguards say nothing about actual 
practices of any police department. And Atwater itself did not support 
the notion that police departments will be particularly proficient at 
policing themselves to limit warrantless arrests for minor arrests.180  
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 174. 
177. See, e.g., Glasgow v. Beary, 2 F. Supp. 3d 419, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The 
constitutionality of a full custodial arrest based only on probable cause 
for a non-criminal traffic infraction is unclear and dubious.”); Smith v. 
Kelly, No. C11-623RAJ, 2012 WL 1605123, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2012) 
(holding that the police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by 
arresting the plaintiff for jaywalking, a noncriminal offense); Bostic v. 
Rodriguez, 667 F. Supp. 2d 591, 609 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that the 
police officer violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by 
arresting him for “remain[ing] belligerent” and “waving his hands” while 
the plaintiff remained seated in his car). 
178. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351–52 (2001). 
179. Id. at 352. 
180. Richard Frase offered a compelling account of the deficiency of the Court’s 
analysis, highlighting the virtual uselessness of probable cause hearings to 
protect the interests of arrestees, who likely would prefer remaining free 
to a prompt hearing reviewing their arrest. See Richard Frase, What Were 
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In stark contrast to the Atwater majority’s position, there is no 
doubt that police routinely make arrests for low level offenses. As 
Wayne Logan has pointed out, case law supports this position, as does 
the sheer volume of arrests for minor offenses.181 “An estimated ten 
million misdemeanor cases are filed annually,”182 dwarfing the one 
million felony convictions secured every year. As recounted in Part I, 
many police departments have explicitly adopted order maintenance 
strategies that explicitly aim to arrest a high number of people for minor 
offenses.183 
In sum, the Court has made clear that it has no Fourth Amendment 
quarrel with arrests for almost anything that take place almost 
anywhere besides the interior of a person’s home.184 When this broad 
power is used in places where the laws or rules are wide-ranging, such 
as in places where mass criminalization is the norm, the police have 
virtually unchecked authority to arrest. Moreover, such arrests are 
especially attractive when enforcement-oriented policing strategies are 
favored. 
 
They Thinking? Fouth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City 
of Lago Vista, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 329, 365–68 (2002).  
181. Logan, supra note 163, at 429–32. 
182. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1314–15 
(2012). 
183. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. For example, the NYPD 
alone has arrested a huge number of people for minor offenses in recent 
years, roughly 200,000 people annually, reflecting a significant uptick since 
the NYPD adopted Broken Windows policing strategies. Amanda Geller, 
The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level Arrests in the Broken 
Windows Era, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1025, 1032 (2016) (highlighting data 
showing that the number of misdemeanor arrests ranged from 189,630 to 
236,857 between 2003 and 2012). “Between 1993 and 2010 the number of 
misdemeanor arrests [by the NYPD] almost doubled.” Issa Kohler-
Haussman, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L. 
Rev. 611, 630 (2014). “At least two million arrests over the past two 
decades are attributable to increased misdemeanor enforcement.” K. Babe 
Howell, The Costs of Broken Windows Policing: Twenty Years and 
Counting, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1059, 1063 (2016). The NYPD made 
roughly an additional 200,000 nonfelony arrests in 2014 as compared to 
1989. Id. And between 2000 and 2004, the NYPD arrested approximately 
17,000 people annually for low level offenses not included in New York’s 
Penal Law. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The 
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. 
of L. & Soc. Change 271, 283 & n.65 [hereinafter Howell, Broken Lives 
from Broken Windows]. 
184. And, as noted above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heien v. North 
Carolina allows arrests even when police are wrong about the law. See 
supra note 123. 
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C. Search for Anything: The Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the 
Warrant Requirement 
An examination of the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement is also necessary to understand the diminished 
Fourth Amendment rights of public and patrolled housing denizens. 
Unlike the standards for stops and arrests, which are now fairly well 
settled, this doctrine is in flux with a substantial split among lower 
courts as to whether mere probable cause of an arrestable offense is 
sufficient to trigger the exception to the warrant requirement, or 
whether an actual arrest is required. Resolution of this question has 
substantial ramifications for the right of people in public and patrolled 
housing to be free from unreasonable searches. 
It is accepted that a warrant generally is required before a police 
officer conducts a search.185 The Supreme Court has observed that the 
warrant requirement reflects the constitutional guarantee that a neutral 
magistrate, rather than a police officer, ordinarily should decide 
whether a search is justified: 
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent 
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a 
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not 
to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal 
activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the 
need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right 
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of 
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals.186 
Accordingly, the “basic rule” is that “searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”187 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement more than a century ago,188 but 
 
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[T]he police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures 
through the warrant procedure . . . .”). 
186. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948). 
187. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1968)); see also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 
499 (1958) (explaining that Supreme Court has “jealously and carefully 
drawn” only a few, narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant 
requirement). 
188. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (noting the “right 
on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and 
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confusion about its scope and meaning has reigned since. In 1969, the 
Court attempted to clear up the confusion in Chimel v. California,189 
when it held that the “proper extent” of a search incident to arrest is 
“a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate 
control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which 
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”190 This 
rule significantly narrowed the scope of searches that had been 
approved previously.191 But even with Chimel in place, “[b]y 
design, . . . searches incident to arrest are both thorough and 
invasive.”192 
 
American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested 
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime”). 
189. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
190. Id. at 762–63. 
191. Over approximately the next fifty years following Weeks, the Court flip-
flopped as to whether the exception permitted a search of only the person 
and the area immediately surrounding him or her, or a comprehensive 
search of the location where the arrest was effected, including homes. 
Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950) (quoting 
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392) (permitting a search of “the place where the 
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime” 
as a search incident to arrest), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 
(1947) (holding that the search of an apartment where an arrest was made 
for forged checks met Fourth Amendment standards), and Marron v. 
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (upholding search of residence where 
an arrest was made), and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) 
(noting, in dictum, permissibility of search of “the place where the arrest 
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its 
fruits or as the means by which it was committed”), with Trupiano v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (rejecting search of arrest site), and 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (holding search of desk 
drawers and cabinet unlawful), and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (holding unlawful search of office where arrest 
occurred), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that 
officers lawfully searched an automobile based on probable cause that the 
vehicle contained intoxicating liquor). 
192. Seth W. Stoughton, Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory 
Restriction of Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1727, 
1768 (2011). Instructions for police officers on how to conduct a search 
incident to arrest from “[a] widely circulated law enforcement text first 
published in 1980” are illuminating: 
Your search should be systematic, so you cover [the arrestee’s] 
entire body from his head to his toes. A good place to look first is 
around the suspect’s midriff . . . . 
After checking the waist area, go to the top of his head and check 
all areas down to his toes. Work from top to bottom, right to 
left—and maintain the same search system on each suspect. That 
way you won’t forget any area. 
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The Court’s reasoning for limiting searches incident to arrest to the 
arrestee’s person and area within his immediate control rested on the 
justifications for the exception: ensuring that arrests are not 
compromised, protecting arresting officers, and preventing the 
destruction of evidence.193 That said, in United States v. Robinson,194 
the Court definitively ruled that any arrest is sufficient to invoke the 
exception, relying heavily on the notion that police officers face the risk 
of violence and injury in taking potentially armed suspects into custody 
no matter how minor the arrest charge.195 In Gustafson v. Florida,196 a 
companion case to Robinson, the Court made clear that this rule 
applied even without any concern about the destruction of evidence by 
upholding the search of a driver arrested for a minor driver’s license 
 
No area of the body or item of clothing should be immune from 
searching. Adversaries have been known to carry guns in the 
crotch of their pants . . . inside their hats . . . up their 
sleeves . . . on cords around their necks . . . under coats and 
vests . . . or fastened to their arms or legs by rubber bands or 
tape. Sometimes, they hide them in slings and bandages . . . . 
Others have carried guns taped in their arm pits or under their 
breasts. 
A favorite spot for concealing weapons, often overlooked, is inside 
boots . . . . 
Male officers (and female officers, too, for that matter) are often 
reluctant to search a male suspect’s crotch area . . . . 
Similarly, male officers may be hesitant about searching female 
prisoners on the street . . . . In searching a female, first pull out 
her blouse tail if it’s tucked in; sometimes guns or other weapons 
will fall out. Also consider unsnapping her bra and shaking it by 
its straps . . . . In checking between and under her breasts, on the 
insides of her thighs and around her crotch, use the edge of your 
hand. This can protect you against accusations of improper 
advances. 
Id. at 1768–69 (alterations in original) (quoting Ronald J. Adams et 
al., Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters 261–63 
(1980)). 
193. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. The Court also quoted Justice Frankfurter’s 
observation that “the history and experience which [the Fourth 
Amendment] embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils 
to which it was a response” is the “test of reason which makes a search 
reasonable.” Id. at 765 (quoting Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting)). 
194. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
195. Id. at 235. 
196. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
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offense.197 In short, “it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to 
the authority to search.”198 
Wayne Logan aptly described the import of these rulings: 
Taken together, Robinson and Gustafson marked a significant 
advance in police authority to search incident to arrest. No longer 
did the law require an evidentiary nexus between the items seized 
and the basis for arrest; nor must there be a discernible threat to 
officer safety. Police were freed to conduct full-body searches 
subsequent to any arrest, and permitted to seize any and all 
weapons or contraband they might find. In sum, for the first time, 
the Court laid down a “bright-line rule” that tied search incident 
authority to the occurrence of a “lawful custodial arrest,” without 
regard to the factual particularities of the police-citizen 
encounter.199 
As noted above, the question that has more recently been 
percolating through the lower courts regarding this exception is whether 
mere probable cause of an arrestable offense is sufficient to trigger the 
exception to the warrant requirement or whether an actual arrest is 
required. In 1996, the Supreme Court arguably provided an answer to 
that question in Knowles v. Iowa,200 when it held that the exception 
was not properly applied when a police officer searched a motorist to 
whom he had already issued a ticket for speeding.201 The officer had 
intended to send the motorist on his way until “under the driver’s seat 
he found a bag of marijuana and a ‘pot pipe,’”202 but instead an arrest 
then followed the discovery.203 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held 
that the two rationales for the search incident to arrest exception 
identified in Robinson—“(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to 
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later 
 
197. Id. at 265 (“It is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest 
the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest and placed the 
petitioner in custody . . . . [T]he arguable absence of ‘evidentiary’ purpose 
for a search incident to a lawful arrest is not controlling.”). 
198. Id. at 266. 
199. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to 
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 381, 394 (2001) 
(internal citations omitted).  
200. 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
201. Id. at 114. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
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use at trial”204—did not justify a search incident to citation.205 It 
recognized that the interest in officer safety “[did] not by itself justify 
the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type 
search.”206  
Although Knowles appears to provide a clear answer (in the 
negative) to the question of whether a search incident to mere probable 
cause is permissible,207 its meaning has been debated extensively in the 
lower courts. Of particular importance is the set of cases finding no 
constitutional quarrel with “warrantless searches without initial arrests 
simply when (1) probable cause to arrest exists independent of the fruits 
of the search and (2) the arrest, conducted after the search, is deemed 
broadly contemporaneous.”208 Those cases largely rest on Rawlings v. 
Kentucky,209 in which the Supreme Court, seemingly unwittingly, 
identified the contemporaneity of a search to an arrest as relevant to 
the permissibility of a search incident to arrest, even though the search 
preceded the defendant's arrest.210 In the nearly four decades since 
Rawlings was decided, numerous courts have interpreted it to permit 
searches incident to arrest that occurred before arrest, including when 
there is little or no reason to believe that arrest was inevitable.211   
204. Id. at 116 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)). 
205. Id. at 117. 
206. Id.  
207. Wayne Logan has pointed out that the Court’s decision in Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) also supports the notion that a custodial 
arrest must have been effectuated for the search incident to arrest 
exception to apply. Logan, supra note 199, at 406 & n.163 (citing Cupp, 
412 U.S. at 296 (“Where there is no formal arrest, . . . a person might 
well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, 
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence on his person. . . . [W]e 
do not hold that a full Chimel search would have been 
justified . . . without a formal arrest and without a warrant.”)). 
208. Logan, supra note 199, at 408. 
209. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
210. Id. at 111. There, after detaining people at a house where they had 
intended to arrest another man on drug charges, police searched a purse 
and discovered drugs. Id. at 100–01. After a man identified the drugs as 
his, the officers searched him and discovered additional contraband. Id. 
at 101. 
211. Logan collected cases reflecting this phenomenon as of 2001. See Logan, 
supra note 199, at 408 n.171. More recent appellate cases reflecting this 
trend include the following: United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 
2017); United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc); 
United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Knop v. State, 
No. 11-0692, 2012 WL 3589980, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012) 
(finding that the pre-arrest search of the defendant was valid because the 
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The risk that this doctrine poses to residents and visitors of public 
and patrolled housing is grave. United States v. Diaz,212 recently decided 
by the Second Circuit, illustrates this dynamic well. It involved a search 
followed by arrest in the patrolled hallway of a Bronx private apartment 
building enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program/Operation Clean 
Halls.213 As noted above, the Clean Halls program allows NYPD officers 
to patrol the hallways and other common areas of private apartment 
buildings.214 In Diaz, the defendant was “sitting next to a bottle of 
vodka and holding a red plastic cup.”215 At a suppression hearing, the 
officer who ultimately arrested Diaz testified that “she did not initially 
intend to arrest Diaz, only to issue him a summons for violating New 
York’s open-container law.”216 After ordering him to stand and produce 
identification, Diaz’s “fumbl[ing] with his hands in his jacket pockets 
and rearrang[ing] his waistband,” inspired the officer to frisk Diaz, 
revealing a gun.217 Upon discovery, he was arrested.218 
In heavy reliance on Rawlings and prior Second Circuit precedent, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the frisk was properly considered a 
search incident to arrest.219 It distinguished Knowles because the search 
 
officers had “probable cause to arrest [the defendant] for . . . traffic 
violations” at the time of the search); State v. Sherman, 931 So.2d 286, 
297 (La. 2006) (holding that where police have probable cause to arrest 
and conduct a search incident to arrest, “the fruits of that search may not 
be suppressed merely because the police did not intend to arrest the 
suspect for the offense for which probable cause existed”); State v. O’Neal, 
921 A.2d 1079, 1086–87 (N.J. 2007) (holding that a warrantless search of 
the defendant was lawful because the police officers had probable cause 
at the time of the search to arrest the defendant for a drug offense, even 
though the search preceded the arrest). But see Ochana v. Flores, 347 
F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, it is legal to search a vehicle 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest” but a “traffic citation alone” does 
not justify such a search, “even if there is probable course for the traffic 
stop, or probable cause to arrest the driver for the traffic violation.”); 
Belote v. State, 981 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Md. 2009) (“Where there is no 
custodial arrest, however, these underlying rationales for a search incident 
to arrest do not exist.”).  
212. 854 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2017). 
213. Id. at 200–01. 
214. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.  
215. Diaz, 854 F.3d at 200. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 200–01. 
218. Id. at 201. 
219. Id. at 205–09 (discussing United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 
1977)). The court declined to address whether the frisk was lawful 
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 1 (1968). Diaz, 854 F.3d at 209 n.16. 
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at issue took place before the officer issued a ticket.220 In the Diaz 
encounter, it “thus remained uncertain . . . whether the encounter 
would lead to an arrest; the dangers to the officer that accompany the 
prospect of arrest therefore remained present.”221 It further re-casts the 
description of officer safety concerns in Robinson and Knowles as ones 
attendant to encounters where there is the possibility of arrest rather 
than actual arrests.222 
Diaz is emblematic of how Fourth Amendment law and targeted or 
hot spots policing practices combine to result in extraordinarily weak 
protections for people who live in or frequent hot spots, including public 
or patrolled housing, targeted by police. Pursuant to Diaz, police 
officers in the Second Circuit are free to search people on the basis of 
probable cause of some arrestable offense without fear that any evidence 
recovered will be suppressed.223 Thus, people who live in patrolled 
housing who, like all people, are very likely to commit some offense in 
or around their homes, are subject to extensive searches “incident to 
arrest” even if they are never arrested and the searching officer never 
intended to arrest them.224 The likelihood of committing such 
infractions is especially high because mass criminalization is at work, 
effectively providing law enforcement with carte blanche to search 
people.225  
220. Id. at 206. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 207 (“Where there is a basis for an arrest, an officer has reason to 
be concerned for her safety until she issues a citation and the stop ends.”). 
223. Because New York’s highest court ruled differently on this issue, police 
departments within New York may not be instructing their officers to 
exploit this doctrine. See People v. Reid, 26 N.E.3d 237, 240 (N.Y. 2014) 
(“Where no arrest has yet taken place, the officer must have intended to 
make one if the ‘search incident’ exception is to . . . app[ly].”). 
224. It is worth noting that Diaz and similar cases leave open the possibility 
that a court could find a police officer personally liable for violating the 
Fourth Amendment if she conducted a search on the basis of mere 
probable cause, but an arrest did not immediately follow. Such claims 
would likely arise in a Section 1983 action. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of 
Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 824 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting, in a Section 1983 
action, that the search incident to arrest exception did not apply to frisk 
of youths stopped by police officers for “riding double” because there was 
no actual arrest). But Section 1983 actions often fail to deter police 
misconduct. See Carbado, supra note 12, at 519–24 (explaining why the 
qualified immunity doctrine and indemnification practices limit liability 
against police officers in Section 1983 cases). 
225. Tracey Maclin’s description of why such searches gain attention 
infrequently is instructive: 
[Searches] are low-visibility affairs. Even though individual 
privacy has been invaded, individuals subjected to such searches 
are not likely to complain because it is probably not worth the 
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D. Policing Public and Patrolled Housing in New York City: “Just Go 
to the Well”226 
The experience in New York City is useful for an examination of 
how these Fourth Amendment doctrines, which are already 
acknowledged to provide weak protection for the urban poor, can be 
exploited by police departments intent on using their maximum 
authority in places they deem problematic. The New York City Police 
Department’s recent practices in both public and private housing offer 
a window into how a police focus on hot spots can operate to the 
detriment of Fourth Amendment protection for those who live in or 
frequent locations targeted by police.227 Given that hot spots policing is 
not one-size-fits-all, no case study can or should be considered 
emblematic of how any particular police department will implement its 
chosen hot spots strategy.228 But the New York City experience 
illustrates how an order maintenance approach in combination with the 
limited legal rights and special rules that apply in public and patrolled 
housing make the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures effectively vanish. 
Spread-out over 175,000 apartments in five boroughs, 
approximately 400,000 people live in public housing developments 
operated by the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”).229 
And, like other locales, policing practices in NYHCA are rooted in part 
in the public perception of public housing as a major site of urban 
disorder and criminality in New York City. Policing practices in and 
 
bother. As a result, these searches are not likely to be brought to 
the attention of police supervisors, nor are they likely to merit the 
concern of politicians or the press. Police officers understand this 
phenomenon. As a result, they know they have carte blanche to 
undertake these searches just about whenever they please. 
 Maclin, supra note 2, at 244. 
226. Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. 
Times (July 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/ 
12frisk.html [https://perma.cc/WXY8-8LEA]. 
227. See Davis v. City of New York (Davis II), 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Davis v. City of New York (Davis I), 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
228. As explained above, some police departments implement hot spots 
policing using order-maintenance policing strategies, while others focus on 
problem-oriented policing or community policing. See supra notes 84–97 
and accompanying text. 
229. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., NYCHA 2018 Fact Sheet 1 (2018), https:// 
www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/NYCHA-Fact-Sheet_2018_ 
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SM8-PRT6].  
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around NYHCA developments are partly responsible for that 
perception. 
The role of the NYPD in NYCHA developments has evolved over 
time. Until it merged with the NYPD in 1995, NYCHA had its own 
police force, the Housing Authority Police Department (“HAPD”).230 
HAPD members historically enjoyed strong relationships with NYCHA 
residents and utilized an approach that most strongly resembles 
community policing.231 One important aspect of the HAPD’s strategies 
was its hyper-local assignment of officers to particular developments for 
years at a time, allowing them to develop relationships with residents.232 
The HAPD moved to embrace Broken Windows strategies in the 1980s 
and early 1990s as drug problems reached epidemic levels. Its embrace 
of HUD’s Drug Elimination Program is a good example. As noted 
above, this HUD program provided funds to local public housing 
authorities to combat drug use and crime.233 As implemented in New 
York City, the biggest component of the Drug Elimination Program 
was Operation Safe Home, which “focused on increasing the presence 
of uniformed officers and law enforcement activities . . . with the goal 
of providing a more secure living environment . . . by combating serious 
crime.”234 The chief method used to reach that goal was frequent patrols 
by teams of officers designed to “‘take back’ a development building by 
building.”235 The program grew from forty-eight officers in 1991 to 400 
officers and fifty-seven sergeants in 1995, when the NYCHA police force 
merged with the NYPD.236 
The NYPD maintained the focus on frequent patrols and other 
Broken Windows strategies after HUD ended the Drug Elimination 
Program. Since 1995, the NYPD has provided all police services in 
NYCHA, including both “baseline,” i.e., “ordinary and routine” police 
services, as well as specialized “above Baseline Services.”237 The NYPD  
230. Fritz Umbach, The Last Neighborhood Cops: The Rise and Fall 
of Community Policing in New York Public Housing 161 (2011). 
231. Id. at 47–52 (describing HAPD’s practices between 1960 and 1980). 
232. Id. 
233. Fagan et al., Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, supra 
note 9, at 423 (“The primary goal of DEP was to reduce drug use, drug 
sale, drug-related crime and collateral crime problems by strengthening 
both formal and informal social control in public housing developments.”). 
234. Id. at 427. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 427–28. 
237. Memorandum of Understanding between the New York City Housing 
Authority and the City of New York on Merger of the New York City 
Housing Authority Police Department and the New York City Police 
Department at 7, Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1994) 
(1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP), ECF No.176-1 [hereinafter NYCHA MOU]. 
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is also the entity designated to enforce NYCHA’s “House Rules,”238 
which embrace all manner of behavior, including some that seem 
intended to mimic criminal law, such as bars on trespassing and entry 
into restricted areas.239 For example, until recent litigation, the 
NYCHA’s House Rules banned “lingering,” a rule so vague that 
enforcement depended on the predilections of the officer on patrol.240 
But the House Rules also cover issues that one would not expect the 
police to address, such as waste disposal, moving permits, TV antenna 
installation, and barbecue permits.241 
As described above, certain private apartment buildings in New 
York City are also the sites of an intense police presence. Through the 
Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”), also known as Operation Clean 
Halls, the NYPD receives permission from private landlords to patrol 
the common areas of apartment buildings.242 The original focus of the 
program was “narcotics sales taking place in the common areas of 
private buildings, such as lobbies, stairwells, and rooftops.”243 It later 
expanded to include other criminal activity and quality of life offenses 
in the buildings.244 
 
NYCHA has paid tens of millions of dollars for “above Baseline” services 
annually, such as its vertical patrol program and additional narcotics 
enforcement and patrol services. Id. (describing above baseline services); 
Amended Complaint at 43, Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(No. 1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP) (payments ranged between $58 million and 
$88 million from 1995 to 2008). 
238. NYCHA MOU at 8–9 (“The City, through its police officers, is hereby 
empowered to enforce such NYCHA rules and regulations and perform 
such other duties as shall be determined from time to time by the City 
and NYCHA.”). 
239. See NYCHA Highlights of House Rules, Lease Terms and Policy, Davis 
II, No. 1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012) ECF 194-28. 
240. According to an anonymous housing commander, “‘Getting your mail, 
that’s not lingering . . . . But if you’re hanging out with your friends, or 
sitting in the stairways for a period of time, that’s lingering.’” J. David 
Goodman, Police Patrols in New York Public Housing Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/nyregion/ 
amid-calls-for-police-reform-little-scrutiny-of-public-housing-patrols.html 
[https://perma.cc/R7NR-9PXP]. NYCHA agreed to remove the ban on 
lingering from its House Rules pursuant to the settlement of a class action. 
Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 10, Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (No. 1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP). 
241. NYCHA Highlights of House Rules, Lease Terms and Policy, supra note 
239, at 2, 3. 
242. Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
243. Id. at 517 (internal citations omitted). 
244. Id. at 517–18. 
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One policing tactic common to both NYCHA and TAP buildings is 
the use of “vertical patrols.” Such patrols “consist of two or more police 
officers combing the interior of a . . . building—from roof to 
basement—in an attempt to locate and apprehend trespassers, drug 
dealers, and other criminals.”245 In NYCHA buildings alone, the NYPD 
conducts hundreds of thousands of vertical patrols each year.246 And in 
both and NYCHA and TAP buildings, the NYPD is often a regular 
presence, encountering residents and their visitors inside and around 
the buildings, to the point that some residents have described the 
NYPD as an occupying force.247 
The New York experience lays bare the weakness of Fourth 
Amendment protections for those who reside in and frequent patrolled 
housing. Two recent class actions challenged the NYPD’s NYCHA and 
TAP stop and trespass arrest practices, which were developed in the 
late 2000s.248 Although the cases challenged practices as violative of the 
Fourth Amendment, they also revealed troubling stops and arrests that 
were perfectly lawful. For example, a NYCHA resident was stopped, 
frisked, and ultimately arrested, along with his friend, because he was 
sitting on his own building’s “roof landing,” the platform on the top of 
the stairwell that is connected to the roof through a door.”249 Given 
that the New York Penal Law specifically bans trespassing in public 
housing buildings where there are “conspicuously posted rules or 
regulations governing entry and use,”250 the argument about the arrest’s 
legality turned on whether the plaintiff and his guest had adequate 
 
245. Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 
2002, 2003 (2009). 
246. Id. 
247. A federal court quoted the following statement of a NYCHA resident 
leadership group’s president: 
[W]henever I have an opportunity to talk to someone in law 
enforcement who might listen, my question to them is: Suppose I 
came into your neighborhood tonight and you were in civilian 
attire and you were on your way to the store to get milk and 
cookies for your kids, and I stopped you the way some of your 
personnel do, what would you do? How would you feel about that? 
. . . 
When this type of practice is instituted and done to people on a 
regular basis . . . I use the term “penal colony,” it’s almost like 
we have been colonized for a decade. 
 Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333–34. 
248. See Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 
2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Davis I, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
249. Davis I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 419 & n.78. 
250. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e) (McKinney 2019). 
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notice that the roof landing was an area where a person’s presence was 
prohibited.251 With sufficient notice, the arrest of the resident on his 
own building’s roof landing would have been valid. Similarly, a young 
Bronx man was legally stopped when he, his cousin, and a friend 
approached his grandmother’s TAP building and “knocked loudly” 
because they didn’t have a key.252 These cases of lawful encounters, 
along with the dozens of unlawful ones at the heart of the cases,253 reveal 
that the NYPD did not hesitate to detain and question people in and 
around NYCHA and TAP buildings. It was so easy to identify the 
grounds for conducting stops in NYCHA buildings that one NYPD 
supervisor instructed officers to “[j]ust go the well”—the lobbies of 
public housing buildings—to locate people to stop.254 As one NYCHA 
resident summarized the situation: “‘If you’re standing in front of the 
building, you can’t do that . . . . You can’t sit in the park after dusk. 
They don’t let you do much around here.’”255 Ultimately, the district 
court found that NYPD’s training regarding TAP “taught officers the 
following lesson: stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion 
later.”256 
Many residents of public and patrolled housing in New York City 
have had experiences similar to the plaintiffs’. According to surveys 
conducted by a non-profit legal organization in 2008, 72 percent of 
residents surveyed in one public housing project reported that they had 
been stopped by NYPD officers, including 41 percent who were stopped 
 
251. Davis I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 420–22. NYCHA later issued a document 
titled “Highlights of House Rules, Lease Terms and Policy,” to clarify that 
presence on roof landings was barred. Id. at 422. 
252. Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 504, 526 & n.346 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). He was also 
frisked—which turned into an extensive and illegal search, involving the 
removal of his pocket’s contents. Id. at 505. 
253. For example, in Ligon v. City of New York, concerning TAP, the district 
court found that nine of the eleven stops about which the plaintiffs offered 
testimony were illegal. Id. at 526. The court also cited an analysis of the 
NYPD’s records of stops, demonstrating at least 400 stops in a single year 
made because of mere presence outside of TAP buildings, and over two 
dozen affidavits prepared by the Bronx District Attorney’s Office 
documenting decisions to decline to prosecute arrested persons who were 
stopped solely because they were entering, exiting, or simply near TAP 
buildings in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 545–49; Report of 
Plaintiff’s Expert Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. 
Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP), 
ECF 44-5. 
254. Rivera et al., supra note 226. 
255. Goodman, supra note 240. 
256. Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
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up to five times per year.257 In another development, 63 percent of 
residents who reported having been stopped had been stopped at least 
once in the previous year.258 In response to a 2011 survey of NYCHA 
residents, one-third reported that they or a family member “ha[d] been 
stopped by police in his/her own building or development.”259 In recent 
focus groups and community forums held as part of the “Joint Remedial 
Process” that followed resolution of the cases, NYCHA residents 
communicated that they “often felt overly surveilled and heavily 
policed.”260 
Thus, even following high-profile class actions, the lack of effective 
Fourth Amendment limits allows the NYPD to utilize aggressive 
enforcement practices in NYCHA and TAP buildings. Once inside or 
on the grounds of a NYCHA or TAP building, the NYPD continues to 
have authority to enforce federal, state, and local laws, no matter how 
trivial. Although New York law permits stops only when misdemeanors 
and felonies are suspected,261 it allows police officers to arrest for any 
“offense,” including non-criminal ones.262 Following Atwater and Moore, 
this New York law almost certainly complies with the Fourth 
Amendment. Accordingly, an officer may approach a person for the 
purpose of issuing a citation or conducting an arrest for virtually 
anything—e.g., smoking cigarettes, littering, or riding a bicycle on the 
sidewalk—and the encounter may well end with a criminal case and all 
of its associated costs. In short, when the NYPD targets public and 
patrolled housing, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable seizures is effectively non-existent. 
 
257. New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, No Place Like 
Home 10 (2008). 
258. Id. at 12. 
259. CAAAV: Organizing Asian Cmtys. et al., A Report Card for the 
New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) 10 (2011). 
260. Ariel E. Belen et al., New York City Joint Remedial Process 
on NYPD’s Stop, Question, and Frisk, and Trespass 




261. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2016). 
262. See § 140.10(1)(a) (allowing arrest by police officer for “[a]ny offense when 
he or she has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed 
such offense in his or her presence”); People v. Taylor, 294 A.D. 2d 825 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (upholding arrest for violation of non-criminal open 
container ordinance); People v. Lewis, 50 A.D.3d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008) (upholding arrest for violation of two sections of New York City 
Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, both non-criminal offenses). 
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The New York City example, revealing abuses similar in kind to 
those exposed by Justice Department investigations in Baltimore and 
Newark and private litigation in numerous other cities,263 demonstrates 
that targeted policing in public and patrolled housing does not always 
inure to the benefit of residents and others who find themselves in and 
around hot spots for legitimate reasons. Although hot spots policing 
sounds “smart” in concept, getting stopped, arrested, and searched by 
police in your own building is anything but. Unsurprisingly, the New 
York City example and others show that when mass criminalization is 
exploited, hot spots policing techniques are not always met with 
approval by the communities where they are implemented. Although 
residents of housing complexes plagued by crime surely want safety and 
security, they are also sometimes confronted with substantial 
limitations on their Fourth Amendment rights. 
III. Mass Criminalization in Public and Patrolled 
Housing and Fourth Amendment Values 
The costs of mass criminalization and policing strategies targeted 
at public and patrolled housing are high. On a macro level, 
programmatic stop and frisk, arrests, and searches create alienation 
between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve, 
undermine the legitimacy of the police department and entire justice 
system, promote stereotypes about people of color, direct funds towards 
the criminal justice system rather than other services, and harm public 
health.264 
The toll on individuals can be extraordinarily steep as well. Even 
when they face only minor charges, those who are arrested face 
especially significant consequences, both direct and collateral.265 
 
263. See supra notes 59–75 and accompanying text. 
264. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 21–26 (describing use of racial profiling by 
NYPD and social control of young black and Latinx males as a result of 
programmatic stop and frisk); M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and 
Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing as a Form of 
Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 Drexel L. Rev. 
373, 410–11 (2011) (describing the “critical mass of harms” that result 
from order maintenance policing); Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive 
Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 2321, 2321 (2014) (describing survey results indicating that 
young men in New York City who reported more police contact pursuant 
to NYPD stop and frisk policy also reported more trauma and anxiety); 
Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, supra note 183, at 306–12 
(describing community-level harms of zero tolerance policing). 
265. See Fabricant, supra note 264, at 407–09 (describing consequences of 
convictions); Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, supra note 183 
at 293–306 (same); Huq, supra note 9, at 2429–39 (same); Natapoff, supra 
note 182, at 1323–27 (same); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: 
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Conviction is not necessary; mere arrests can cause significant harm, 
such as the loss of a job or home.266 This risk is amplified in public 
housing. HUD requires public housing agencies to utilize lease terms 
that subject a tenant to eviction if a member of the tenant’s household 
or a guest engages in criminal activity, whether on or off the premises 
of the housing development.267 A public housing agency may pursue 
eviction even when the tenant is completely unaware of the household 
member’s criminal or drug activity.268 With this draconian lease 
provision, it is easy to see how police encounters in public housing could 
lead to eviction, a traumatizing event.269 In the same vein, relatively 
low level criminal charges frequently result in probation, and probation 
 
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 277, 297–306 (2011) (same). 
266. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 852–54 (2015) 
(describing collateral consequences of arrests and recounting tale of Bronx 
man, a plaintiff in Ligon v. City of New York, whose job was jeopardized 
following an arrest for trespassing in patrolled housing due to automatic 
suspension of his security guard license upon arrest); Michael Pinard, 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of 
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 491–92 (2010) (detailing how 
arrest or conviction can affect access to housing). 
267. HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (interpreting statutory provision 
that allows eviction because of a conviction for “any criminal activity that 
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises 
by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity”) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)). 
268. Id. at 136 (holding that the statute “requires lease terms that give local 
public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant 
when a member of the household or a guest engages in drug-related 
activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of 
the drug-related activity”). 
269. In his ethnographic study of families facing eviction and its aftermath in 
Milwaukee, Matthew Desmond evocatively summarized the impact of 
eviction as follows: 
Losing your home and possessions and often your job; being 
stamped with an eviction record and denied government housing 
assistance; relocating to degrading housing in poor and dangerous 
neighborhoods; and suffering from increased material hardship, 
homelessness, depression, and illness—this is eviction’s fallout. 
Eviction does not simply drop poor families into a dark valley, a 
trying yet relatively brief detour on life’s journey. It 
fundamentally redirects their way, casting them onto a different, 
and much more difficult, path. Eviction is a cause, not just a 
condition, of poverty. 
 Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the 
American City 298–99 (2016). 
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violations require eviction from public housing.270 Far from making 
home a refuge, the risk of encounters with police officers are uniquely 
high in public housing.271 
In addition, certain community-wide harms of order maintenance 
policing are especially significant in public and patrolled housing. In 
particular, two previously identified by Aziz Huq with regard to 
programmatic stop and frisk generally are noteworthy. First, there is 
the notion that negative experiences with the criminal justice system 
“dampen[] . . . civic participation . . . in ways that, over time, conduce 
to diminished political power.”272 Specifically, “contact with the 
criminal justice system, including nonconsensual stops, has a 
substantial and statistically significant effect on trust in government,” 
reducing the likelihood of voting.273 Political power does not usually 
reside with the low-income residents of public and patrolled housing, a 
historically marginalized group.274 Policing practices that further 
diminish it mean that the political priorities of residents of public and 
patrolled housing are given short shrift. A brief example from Harlem 
is illustrative. There, in response to growing tensions and fears of 
violence, a group of public housing residents from two developments 
called for services and programs for youth in their communities.275 Their 
 
270. Gustafson, supra note 99, at 667 n.109 (citing Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title 
IX, § 903, 110 Stat. 2185, 2348–49 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1437 (2012))). 
271. It is noteworthy that minimal process is typically available to address 
minor criminal charges. Arrests for misdemeanors and other minor 
infractions often result in quick guilty pleas, and consequently, no 
meaningful opportunities to challenge the constitutionality of the actions 
that ultimately led to arrest. See Natapoff, supra note 182, at 1345–47. 
Officers’ actions escape challenge when suppression hearings, the primary 
vehicle used to challenge the constitutionality of searches and seizures, 
simply do not happen. 
272. Huq, supra note 9, at 2437–38. 
273. Id. at 2438 (citing Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting 
Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime 
Control 150–51 (2014)). 
274. See Mary Pattillo, Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods “As Is,” in 
Public Housing and the Legacy of Segregation 31–46 (Margery 
Austin Turner, Susan J. Popkin & Lynette Rawlings, eds., 2009) 
(describing lack of political influence of low income tenants); Leonard 
Freedman, Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty 200–01 (1969) 
(same with respect to public housing residents). 
275. Harlem Residents: We Asked the City for Help, We Got a Raid Instead, 
Juvenile Justice Info. Exch., (June 5, 2014), https://jjie.org/2014/06/ 
05/harlem-residents-we-asked-city-for-help-we-got-a-raid-instead/107031/ 
[https://perma.cc/8BUX-9TFY]; Jennifer Gonnerman, A Daughter’s Death, 
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efforts went unheeded, and instead, the NYPD and Manhattan District 
Attorney’s office conducted a massive raid of the developments—then 
the biggest in New York City history—which resulted in over forty 
arrests.276 
Second, Huq pointed to a reduction in “collective efficacy” for 
communities bearing the brunt of programmatic stop and frisk, i.e., 
“‘the linkage of mutual trust and the shared willingness to 
intervene.’”277 Collective efficacy creates social control that addresses 
crime.278 This could be especially useful in public and patrolled housing, 
where community members have regular and repeated contact with 
each other; all benefit when they can rely on each other to help preserve 
safety and security. Police practices that operate to impede collective 
efficacy have obvious deleterious effects. This is particularly noteworthy 
given that one study indicates that experiencing frequent police stops 
and police intrusiveness during stops can predict criminal behavior by 
those subjected to the stops.279 Overall, the community-wide harms 
generally associated with order maintenance practices are concentrated 
and localized such that the marginalization of the residents of public 
and patrolled housing is further cemented. 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment functions in public and patrolled 
housing to support the use of order-maintenance police practices that 
further marginalize impoverished communities. The powers to stop, 
arrest, and search are extraordinary under modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and together, they are highly dangerous for the rights of 
people who could easily commit noncriminal infractions in places where 
mass criminalization is in play, such as public and patrolled housing. 
Fourth Amendment law also does nothing to impede the importation 
of pernicious racial stereotypes and in fact allows them to flourish by 
permitting pretextual stops. Indeed, through (low) bright-line 
standards that allow stops, arrests, and searches for virtually anything, 
 
New Yorker (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2015/10/05/a-daughters-death [https://perma.cc/33AZ-BN2N]. 
276. J. David Goodman, Dozens of Gang Suspects Held in Raids in Manhattan, 
N.Y. Times (June 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/ 
nyregion/dozens-of-suspected-gang-members-arrested-in-raid-of-2-harlem-
housing-projects.html [https://perma.cc/C7BR-SMF9]. 
277. Huq, supra note 9, at 2438 (quoting Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood 
Effects, Causal Mechanisms, and the Social Structure in the City, in 
Analytic Sociology and Soc. Mechanisms 227, 232 (Pierre 
Demeulenaere, ed., 2011)). 
278. Id. 
279. Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable 
Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. of Empirical 
Legal Stud. 751, 773–74 (2014) (finding that frequency of stops and 
police intrusiveness during stops were “significant predictors of criminal 
behavior”). 
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Fourth Amendment law facilities police actions made on the basis of 
such stereotypes and permits the use of the criminal justice system to 
impose social control on an unpopular group. 
IV. Providing Protection and Restoring Dignity to 
Public and Patrolled Housing Residents 
Only complex answers are available to the challenging question of 
how to address the legal deficiencies that allow public and patrolled 
housing to become occupied territories in ways that completely bely 
traditional notions of the sanctity of the home. This Article suggests 
that they rest in three categories: rethinking Fourth Amendment 
standards so that they reflect the traditional protection for the home; 
limiting the authority of local and state actors through the adoption of 
state constitutional and legal standards that reject the cramped 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment; and devising local policies 
to reject targeted and hot spots strategies that resemble occupation. 
Each is amplified below. 
A. Answering Open Questions of Fourth Amendment Law 
A key reason for the weak Fourth Amendment protection of public 
and patrolled housing residents is the Supreme Court’s traditional focus 
on searches rather than seizures. The Court has developed numerous 
standards with searches in mind rather than seizures. As Lauryn Goldin 
has observed, seizures are the “neglected sibling” in Fourth Amendment 
law.280 The cost of the Supreme Court’s inattention to the interests at 
stake in defining Fourth Amendment standards for seizures rather than 
searches has an ever-expanding universe of conditions under which 
seizures may take place. 
Two clarifications of Fourth Amendment law would significantly 
improve constitutional protections for residents of public and patrolled 
housing such that the Supreme Court’s avowed protection for the home 
is more consistent. First, courts should clarify that Terry stops are not 
permitted when law enforcement officers suspect only noncriminal 
infractions. Second, courts should make clear that the search incident 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies only when an arrest 
actually takes place. These areas are particularly important because 
both are gateways to greater intrusions in contravention of fundamental 
Fourth Amendment interests.281  
280. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 Denv. L. Rev. 
53, 59 (2015). 
281. This Article has identified several other areas of Fourth Amendment law 
that allow significant intrusions by law enforcement officers into the lives 
of public and patrolled housing residents. Because others have offered 
extensive critiques of these issues and offered laudable suggestions for 
doctrinal improvements, this Article does not propose additional 
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In contrast with a “consensual encounter” that a “reasonable 
person” feels they can terminate at any point, a Terry stop constitutes 
a significant show of police authority. When an officer may claim that 
a person is not free to leave—the sine qua non of a Terry stop—further 
incursions on the stopped person’s freedom of movement and privacy 
can quickly follow. The initiation of a Terry stop allows an officer to 
ask invasive questions, run a records check, or perhaps demand that 
the stopped person stand in the hallway outside their door. Frisks also 
frequently accompany stops, even greater invasions of personal space, 
privacy, and autonomy.282 Given that the fundamental justification for 
Terry stops—crime control—is unavailable, stop authority should be 
unavailable as well. 
In addition, since infractions are, by definition, exceedingly minor 
violations of the law, investigations of the type permitted by Terry are 
simply unnecessary. In Terry itself, Officer McFadden suspected a 
serious crime—burglary—that virtually all would agree warrants police 
attention. In stark contrast, public urination, loitering, and other 
typical minor infractions are not occurrences that require investigation 
of any kind; if a police officer observes such an offending behavior, they 
usually may address it by issuing a ticket or summons on the spot; the 
questioning and records checking that typically accompany Terry stops 
are simply unnecessary. As noted above, some states’ laws recognize as 
much, barring stops unless felonies or certain misdemeanors are 
suspected.283 
The minor infractions that fit this category can be distinguished 
from the traffic infractions for which courts have usually permitted 
stops.284 At least traffic laws have some safety rationale; the same 
cannot always be said for minor infractions of the type often enforced 
in public and patrolled housing.285 Moreover, given that Terry 
represents a significant deviation from the Fourth Amendment 
standards for seizures and the intrusions it creates can be substantial, 
its expanded application should not be assumed. 
Similarly, the expansive search authority that some police 
departments assert once an officer has mere probable cause of an  
observations in those areas. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141 
(offering suggestions for clarifying and improving the high-crime area 
doctrine); Frase, supra note 180 (same for arrest authority for minor 
infractions); Logan, supra note 163 (same for arrest authority for minor 
infractions). 
282. See, e.g., Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 6, at 684. 
283. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
284. See Woods, supra note 120, at 712–13 & n.181 (collecting cases). 
285. This suggestion is not meant to downplay the significant intrusions that 
car stops often constitute and the even greater ones to which they often 
lead. See generally Harris, supra note 122. 
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arrestable offense leads to significant infringements on Fourth 
Amendment rights and should be cabined. Instead of simply being 
questioned, which alone can be harassing, searches are often intense 
physical invasions.286 Wayne Logan has suggested that the trigger for 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement 
should therefore be the “intent-manifestation” approach, i.e., whether 
an officer has demonstrated both an intent to arrest and whether there 
is evidence of “an officer’s intent to follow through with the 
prosecution.”287 The California Supreme Court utilized a similar 
approach when it held that the search incident exception did not apply 
to a search that followed a stop of a bicyclist for failing to stop at a 
stop sign.288 New York’s Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, 
has adopted part of this test permitting application of the exception 
only when an officer intends to make an arrest.289 Either of these 
approaches is a significant improvement over the free-for-all that ensues 
when courts permit application of the search incident to arrest 
exception merely because an officer identified probable cause of an 
arrestable offense.290 
B. State Law 
Answers to the problem of hyper-aggressive policing in public and 
patrolled housing also lie at the state level. In particular, state law—
 
286. See Stoughton, supra note 192, at 1768. 
287. Logan, supra note 199, at 434. 
288. People v. Macabeo, 384 P.3d 1189, 1219 (Cal. 2016) (holding that search 
incident exception did not apply, in part because there were no “objective 
indicia to suggest . . . that the officers would have arrested defendant in 
violation of state law”). 
289. See People v. Reid, 26 N.E.3d 237, 240 (N.Y. 2014) (“Where no arrest 
has yet taken place, the officer must have intended to make one if the 
‘search incident’ exception is to be applied.”). 
290. Another option to address the Fourth Amendment’s facilitation of 
aggressive policing in public and patrolled housing would be to revamp 
the key standards that underlie it. In particular, courts could develop 
standards that account for the special status of the home such that the 
treatment of people who in public and patrolled housing does not differ 
so wildly from residents of private homes. Fundamentally, such a change 
would rest on reconceptualizing the idea of “home” and the areas where 
residents are entitled to higher presumptions of Fourth Amendment 
protection. As noted above, the thresholds of the apartments of public 
and patrolled housing residents mark the beginning of traditional Fourth 
Amendment protection for the home. See supra note 105 and 
accompanying text. After crossing the threshold, residents find themselves 
not within protected curtilage, but in spaces that, for all intents and 
purposes, are the same as a public sidewalk. Of course, the similarities 
between public sidewalks and common areas of multi-unit buildings are 
limited. 
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whether constitutional or statutory—can be drafted or interpreted in 
two ways that will reduce the likelihood of abusive practices: rejecting 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater by narrowing arrest authority 
to ban arrests for minor infractions, and decriminalizing minor 
misconduct.291 
With regard to arrest authority, states can make clear that arrests 
for minor offenses are banned under state law. States can accomplish 
this either legislatively, by enacting statutes that ban arrests, or 
through state courts interpreting state constitutions to ban arrests for 
minor offenses. Some state statutes already ban such arrests explicitly, 
but it is more common for states to attempt decriminalization by 
mandating that fines are the appropriate penalty rather than jail 
time.292 With the latter approach, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Virginia v. Moore makes clear that merely limiting the punishment 
options will not necessarily thwart arrests. As noted above, the Court 
held there that the Fourth Amendment allowed an arrest for driving 
with a suspended license even though Virginia law allowed only issuance 
of a citation for that offense.293 
Alternatively, state courts where state constitutional protections 
for searches and seizures are not co-extensive with the Fourth 
Amendment can limit arrest authority under state law.294 Specifically, 
 
291. In accordance with the recommendations in Part IV.A, supra, states may 
also interpret their state constitutions so that their respective Fourth 
Amendment analogues bar stops for minor infractions and application of 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 
292. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1055, 1079 (2015). 
293. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“[T]he arrest rules that the 
officers violated were those of state law alone, and . . . it is not the 
province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That 
Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a 
constitutionally permissible arrest.”). 
294. See, e.g., State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900, 910 (Mont. 2001) (“[T]he range 
of warrantless searches which may be lawfully conducted under the 
Montana Constitution is narrower than the corresponding range of 
searches that may be lawfully conducted pursuant to the federal Fourth 
Amendment.”); State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 2006) (noting 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has “not hesitated [to] . . . afford 
[New Jersey’s] citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures under [the New Jersey Constitution] than would be the case 
under its federal counterpart”); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. 
1993) (rejecting extension of “plain view” exception to the warrant 
requirement to encompass the “plain touch” of contraband under New 
York Constitution); State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 48 (Wash. 2002) 
(explaining that Washington Constitution’s protections against searches 
and seizures are “qualitatively different from those provided by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution”). In some states, 
constitutional protection for searches and seizures is co-extensive with the 
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state constitutional protections can be interpreted to require the 
suppression of arrests for minor misconduct and any evidence gathered 
as a result of such arrests. Although the Fourth Amendment does not 
bar such arrests, local and state authorities are bound by state 
constitutional law and typically act accordingly. 
C. Local Laws and Policies 
Policy change at the local level, by police departments, public 
housing authorities, or local governments, is also available to reform 
hyper-aggressive policing practices in public and patrolled housing. 
Because most of these entities have direct policymaking authority over 
the law enforcement agencies that patrol public and patrolled housing, 
reform achieved at this level is likely to have the most immediate 
impact. 
First and foremost, police departments that work in public and 
patrolled housing can choose to target public and patrolled housing only 
when necessary. More specifically, they can adopt the proven hot spots 
policing strategies that rely on rigorous data analysis to identify 
locations that are actual hot spots. As noted above, public housing is 
frequently subjected to outsized police attention because of stereotypes 
about the people who live there.295 Contrary to this discriminatory 
approach, police departments should embrace community policing or 
problem-oriented policing models that have proven effective at 
addressing crime without the collateral damage to the dignity, 
autonomy, and freedom of law-abiding people who live in public and 
patrolled housing. 
Local governments, with the authority to regulate the law 
enforcement agencies within their jurisdictions, can also require police 
departments to undertake policing strategies that inflict the least harm 
on Fourth Amendment interests in public and patrolled housing. This 
approach may be particularly potent if local governments have 
authority over local public housing authorities and similar entities that 
can directly manage the scope of rules enforced by police. 
Conclusion 
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures offered 
by the Fourth Amendment in public and patrolled housing does not 
resemble that available to denizens of other locales. Such homes are not 
impenetrable “castles” that law enforcement can breach only when 
meeting stringent standards. Instead, largely because of the vast array 
of behavior that is regulated in public and patrolled housing, law 
enforcement officers have broad authority to stop, arrest, and search  
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Macabeo, 384 P.3d 1189, 1212 
(Cal. 2016) (noting limit on such protection under California law). 
295. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
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people in and around such locations. When police focus their attention 
on public and patrolled housing, whether through targeted programs or 
hot spots strategies, the result is significant abrogation of the right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents. 
This Article should not be read to suggest that police officers act 
in accordance with the full extent of their power in all situations. Police 
officers have extraordinary discretion and often exercise it wisely. But, 
as the New York City experience demonstrates, police practices that 
exploit the full extent of police powers to stop, arrest, and search in 
locations where mass criminalization is at work pose real risks to the 
privacy and liberty rights that are supposed to be protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Although reformers have called for the use of hot spots policing and 
“smart policing” in response to evidence of police misconduct such as 
programmatic stop and frisk, there are not significant limits on the 
potential for abuse given the Fourth Amendment standards outlined 
above. Even when these often-lauded strategies are implemented, police 
may stop, arrest, and search with abandon. They also remain free to 
rely on pernicious stereotypes. In short, for people like the residents of 
public and patrolled housing developments that are a bullseye for law 
enforcement, a focus on hot spots does not offer relief from the harms 
of programmatic stop-and-frisk and similar Broken Windows policies. 
